Digital Certificates, Certification Authorities, and Public Key Infrastructure Sections 14.3-14.5 Basic Problem · What does a public-key signature verification tell you? Verification parameters include public key, and successful verification says "Only someone holding the corresponding private key could have made this signature." • What do you want a signature verification to tell you? Probably something like "Joe Smith signed this." • Problem: What assurance do you have that the public key really belongs to Joe Smith? What is a Digital Certificate? · Associates an identity/properties with a public key - Identity can be person's name, website, e-mail, ... - Properties can be valid key uses, age of individual, access rights

- granted, ...
- Signed by someone you trust
 - Signature is trusted party vouching for ID/key pair
 Role is similar to a notary public
- · Some typical properties of certificates:
 - Good for a set time (validity period)
 - Must get a new certificate after expiration
 - Certificates may be revoked

More on Certificates

- · Common types of certificates:
 - X.509 standard (version 3)
 - PGP certificates
- · Who signs certificates? Several possibilities:
 - Independent "Certification Authority" organization
 - Disinterested third party company or government
 - \bullet Examples: Verisign, Deutsche Telekom, Entrust, AOL, \dots
 - Internal (organizational) certification authority
 - · Organization controls certificates for employees or clients
 - Could be just an individual you trust
 - This is how PGP certificates are typically certified

X.509 Certificates

- · Most prevalent type of digital certificate
- · Related to X.500 directory services
- · An integral part of the Web
 - All major web browsers and servers support X.509
 - CA "industry" (Verisign, etc.) built around X.509
- Also part of secure e-mail specifications
 - S/MIME
- Currently "version 3" of X.509
 - Includes a flexible "extension field" capability

X.500 Names

(Also called "Distinguished Names")

- · Hierarchical naming
- · Parts of names are attribute/value pairs
- Example attributes:
 - C=country
 - ST=state
 - L=locality
 - O=organization
 - OU=organizational unit
 - CN=common name

-	

Important "Additional Information"

- · How does a CA state how they do business?
 - A Certification Practices Statement (CPS) is a human-readable statement of practices used by CA
 - Based on this, a person/vendor may decide whether to trust or not trust the CA
 Problem: What if CPS becomes a dead link? Trust the CA?
- · Where to obtain the Certification Revocation List (CRL)
 - Called a CRL Distribution Point (CDP)
 - Certificates may be revoked due to
 - Private key compromised
 - · Incorrectly issued certificate
 - CA compromised
 - · Properties change
 - CRL contains unexpired revoked certificates
 - Current size of Symantec CRL: 1,266,051 bytes (36,162 entries)

Example: Amazon Certificate

(Extension fields removed)

```
Nata:

Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:

0::a5:09:3e:a5:7e:74:db:8a:d3:7d:44:83:20:f9:dd
Signature Algorithm: shalWithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=US, O=RSA Data Security, Inc., OU=Secure Server Certification Authority
Validity
Not Before: Jan 6 00:00:00 2005 GMT
Not After: Jan 6 23:79:59 2006 GMT
Subject: C=US, 5T=Washington, L=Seattle, O=Amazon.com Inc., CN=www.amazon.com
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit):
00:a3:d0:bb:fe:27:c7:96:40:9d:9e:9c:67:69:e4:
... [ Deleted ] ...
| Deleted | ... | Deleted | ... | Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) | Signature Algorithm: ShalWithR&Encryption | 2e:7b:84:6a:95:ba:85:75:7b:9b:8e:82:51:9f:19:0e:eb:51:
```

Example: Amazon Certificate, Part 2

Extension fields

X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE CA:FALSE X599V3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X599V3 CRL Distribution Points: URI:http://crl.verisign.com/RSASecureServer.crl X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.840.1.113733.1.7.23.3 CPS: https://www.verisign.com/rpa X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication Authority Information Access: OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.verisign.com 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.12: 0__].[9Y0W0U.:mage/gif0!0.0..+.....k...j.H., {..0%.#http://logo.verisign.com/vslogo.gif

Certificate Chains (Hypothetical) "Trust Anchor" or "Root CA" Subject: Verisign Verisign Public Key Subject: UNCG CS CA Issuer: Verisign (trusted) UNCG CS Public Key Issuer: UNCG CA Signs Signs Signs Subject: UNCG CA Subject: Steve Tate UNCG Public Key Steve's Public Key Issuer: Verisign Issuer: UNCG CS CA

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

- A PKI is "a collection of technologies and policies for creating and using digital certificates." [Garfinkel and Spafford]
- Many people originally envisioned an official digital ID system
 - In reality: Very little personal ID done with certificates mostly used for server identification
 - Could change if security tokens or smart cards become more prevalent! Maybe smartphones?

Another Trust Model: PGP "Web of Trust"

- · PGP is "Pretty Good Privacy"
 - Originally for e-mail encryption/signing
 - Now regularly used for software verification
 - Originally written by Phil Zimmerman
 - Now several free and commercial versions
 - GPG ("Gnu Privacy Guard") if a Free-Software alternative (they use only free algorithms)
- Trust model is less hierarchical than X.509
- · I can sign keys and distribute them
 - Anyone who trusts me can use me as a CA!
 - Difference between "trusted" and "valid" keys

PGP/GPG Keyservers

- Problem: How do you get public keys?
 - Note: In PGP public keys are always certificates
- · Solution: Keyservers databases of keys
 - You can submit your own keys
 - You can look up keys by name or e-mail address
 - Support integrated into many e-mail programs
- · Keyservers can be accessed in many ways
 - LDAP
 - HTTP
 - E-mail


Keyserver example – WWW interface

Sending an encrypted email - Step 1: Look up the key



Keyserver example – WWW interface

Sending an encrypted email – Step 2: Find the right one - who vouches for it?





Some problems with certificates

- · Private keys are not people
- · Distinguished names are not people
- · There are too many Robert Smiths
- X.509 v3 doesn't allow selective disclosure
- · Ubiquitous certificates could lead to privacy issues
- · How do you loan a key?
- · Signatures are "brittle"
- But overall: Not perfect, but solves some important problems