CSC 580 Cryptography and Computer Security

The RSA Algorithm and Key Size Issues (Section 9.2 and more)

March 15, 2018

Overview

Today

- Overview/demo of research tools
- The RSA Algorithm key sizes and factoring

Next:

- Read Sections 2.8, 10.1, and 10.2
- Complete ungraded homework 6
- Remember to be working on graded homework 2 (due next Thurs)

First up... some demos of research tools

Tools being demonstrated:

- Zotero (managing papers, citations, etc.)
- · LaTeX and paper format templates
- BibTeX

Back to Crypto... Recap of last time <u>Miller-Rabin Primality Testing</u>: There is an efficient randomized algorithm for testing if large numbers are prime (with very low probability of error). • So: There is an efficient algorithm for *finding* large random prime numbers *Euler's totient function*: $\phi(n)$ = number of integers from 1..*n*-1 that are relatively prime to n. <u>Euler's Theorem</u>: For every a and n that are relatively prime (i.e., gcd(a,n)=1), $a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$. **RSA Algorithm** Key Generation: Pick two large primes \boldsymbol{p} and \boldsymbol{q} Calculate $n=p^*q$ and $\phi(n)=(p-1)^*(q-1)$ Pick a random e such that $gcd(e, \phi(n))$ Compute $d = e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$ [Use extended GCD algorithm!] Public key is PU=(n,e); Private key is PR=(n,d)Encryption of message $M \in \{0,..,n-1\}$: $E(PU,M) = M^e \mod n$ Decryption of ciphertext $C \in \{0,...,n-1\}$: $D(PR,C) = C^d \mod n$ **RSA Algorithm** Key Generation: Pick two large primes p and qCalculate $n=p^*q$ and $\phi(n)=(p-1)^*(q-1)$

Pick a random e such that $gcd(e, \phi(n))$

Compute $d = e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$ [Use extended GCD algorithm!]

Public key is PU=(n,e); Private key is PR=(n,d)

Encryption of message $M \in \{0,..,n-1\}$:

Correctness - easy when gcd(M,n)=1: $\mathsf{D}(PR,\mathsf{E}(PU,M))=(M^{\rm e})^d \bmod n$

 $E(PU,M) = M^e \mod n$

 $= M^{ed} \bmod n$ $= M^{k\phi(n)+1} \bmod n$ $= (M^{\phi(n)})^k M \bmod n$

Decryption of ciphertext $C \in \{0,..,n-1\}$:

 $D(PR,C) = C^d \mod n$

Also works when $gcd(M,n)\neq 1$, but slightly harder to show.

RSA Example

Simple example:

$$\begin{split} p &= 73, \, q = 89 \\ n &= p^*q = 73^*89 = 6497 \\ \phi(n) &= (p-1)^*(q-1) = 72^*88 = 6336 \\ e &= 5 \\ d &= 5069 \quad \text{[Note: } 5^*5069 = 25,345 = 4^*6336 + 1 \text{]} \end{split}$$

Encrypting message M=1234: 1234⁵ mod 6497 = 1881

Decrypting:

1881⁵⁰⁶⁹ mod 6497 = 1234

Note: If time allows in class, more examples using Python!

Status of breaking RSA and factoring

Observation: If we could factor fast, we could break RSA

• How: Factor the public modulus n, compute $\phi(n)$, and compute d

So factoring is *sufficient* to break RSA - is it *necessary*?

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So factoring is <u>sufficient</u> to break RSA - is it <u>necessary</u>?

- Answer: no one knows!
- This would be a great result if it could be proved...
- Note: Rabin's PK encryption system is based on a similar concept, and it has been shown that breaking it is equivalent to factoring
 Rabin's scheme isn't used because it is very inefficient bit-by-bit

What we know

Fast factoring ⇒ Break RSA

What we'd like

Break RSA ⇒ Fast factoring

Why? Look at logical contrapositive:

Can't factor fast ⇒ Can't break RSA

How fast can we factor?

Consider an algorithm with running time $\ \Theta\left(2^{c\cdot n^{\alpha}\cdot(\lg n)^{1-\alpha}}\right)$

With α = 1: This is $2^{c \square n}$ -- pure exponential time

With α = 0: This is $2^{c \Box lg(n)} = n^c$ -- pure polynomial time

Algorithm discovery for factoring has generally involved lowering $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$

- q = 1: Brute-force search for factors (exponential time)
- $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$: Quadratic Sieve (1981) still the best for n<300 bits or so
- $\alpha = \frac{1}{3}$: General Number Field Sieve (1990) best for large numbers

But: Constants also matter (esp. the c in the exponent!)...

What are the real-world speeds and consequences?

Comparable Key Sizes

From NIST publication 800-57a

Issue: PK algorithms based on mathematical relationships, and can be broken with algorithms that are faster than brute force.

We spent time getting a feel for how big symmetric cipher keys needed to be

→ How big do keys in a public key system need to be?

	Table 2: Comparable strengths							
From NIST pub 800-57a:	Security Strength	Symmetric key algorithms	FFC (e.g., DSA, D-H)	IFC (e.g., RSA)	ECC (e.g., ECDSA)			
	≤ 80	2TDEA ²¹	L = 1024 N = 160	k = 1024	f=160-223			
	112	3TDEA	L = 2048 N = 224	k = 2048	f = 224-255			
	128	AES-128	L = 3072 N = 256	k = 3072	f= 256-383			
	192	AES-192	L = 7680 N = 384	k = 7680	f=384-511			
	256	AES-256	L = 15360 N = 512	k = 15360	f=512+			