CSC 580 Cryptography and Computer Security

Discrete Logarithms, Diffie-Hellman, and Elliptic Curves (Sections 2.8, 10.1-10.4)

March 20, 2018

## Overview

## Today:

- Discuss homework 6 solutions
- Math needed for discrete-log based cryptography
- Diffie-Hellman and EIGamal
- Elliptic Curves - idea and translation of Diffie-Hellman to ECC

Next:

- Quiz on Thursday (based on HW6 \& formal models)
- Graded Homework 2 due on Thursday!
- Read Chapter 11 (skip SHA-512 logic and SHA3 iteration function)
- Project project due in two weeks (April 3) - don't forget this!


## The Discrete Log Problem

For every prime number $p$, there exists a primitive root (or "generator") $g$ such that
$g^{1}, g^{2}, g^{3}, g^{4}, \ldots, g^{p-2}, g^{p-1} \quad($ all taken $\bmod p)$
are all distinct values (so a permutation of $1,2,3, \ldots, p-1$ ).
Example: 3 is a primitive root of 17 , with powers:

| $i$ | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $3^{i} \bmod 17$ | 3 | 9 | 10 | 13 | 5 | 15 | 11 | 16 | 14 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 12 | 2 | 6 | 1 |

$f_{g, p}(i)=g^{i} \bmod p$ is a bijective mapping on $\{1, \ldots, p-1\}$
$g$ and $p$ are global public parameters
$f_{g, p}(i)$ is easy to compute (modular powering algorithm)
Inverse, written $\operatorname{dlog}_{g, p}(x)=f_{\text {g.p }}^{-1}(x)$, is believed to be difficult to compute

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHE)
Assume $g$ and $p$ are known, public parameters


## ElGamal Encryption

The idea is simple:
Define "long term key" for one side of Diffie-Hellman
Key Generation (Bob):

- $b \leftarrow$ random value from $\{1, \ldots, p-1\}$
- $B \leftarrow g^{b} \bmod p$
- $(B, g, p)$ is public key (i.e., encryption key) - $b$ is private key

For Alice to send a message to Bob:

- Get ( $B, g, p$ ) from Bob
- Pick $k \leftarrow$ random value from $\{1, \ldots, p-1\}$
- For message $M \in\{1, \ldots, p-1\}$, ciphertext $\left(C_{1}, C_{2}\right)=\left(g^{k} \bmod p, M \cdot B^{k} \bmod p\right)$

For Bob to decrypt ciphertext ( $C_{1}, C_{2}$ ):

- $K \leftarrow C_{1}{ }^{b} \bmod p$
// Same as $B^{k}$ above
- $M \leftarrow C_{2} \cdot K^{-1} \bmod p \quad / /$ Same as original plaintext (see DHE for similarity)


## EIGamal Encryption

## Big Warning!!!!

In EIGamal, only one side can be a long-term key!!!
Serious problems if sender re-uses $k$ !

- Pick $k \leftarrow$ random value from $\{1, \ldots, p-1\}$
- For message $M \in\{1, \ldots, p-1\}$, ciphertext $\left(C_{1}, C_{2}\right)=\left(g^{k} \bmod p, M \cdot B^{k} \bmod p\right)$

For Bob to decrypt ciphertext $\left(\mathrm{C}_{1}, \mathrm{C}_{2}\right)$ :

- $K \leftarrow C_{1}{ }^{b} \bmod p$
// Same as $B^{k}$ above
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## Abstracting the Problem

There are many sets over which we can define powering.
Example: Can look at powers of $n \times n$ matrices ( $A^{2}, A^{3}$, etc.)
Any finite set $S$ with an element $g$ such that $f_{g}: S \rightarrow S$ is a bijection (where $f_{g}(x)=g^{x}$ for all $x \in S$ ) is called a cyclic group

- Very cool math here - see Chapter 5 for more info (optional)

If $f_{g}$ is easy to compute and $f_{g}^{-1}$ is difficult, then can do Diffie-Hellman
"Elliptic Curves" are a mathematical object with this property
In fact: $f_{g}^{-1}$ seems to be harder to compute for Elliptic Curves than $\boldsymbol{Z}_{p}$

- Consequence: Elliptic Curves can use shorter numbers/keys than standard Diffie-Hellman - so faster and less communication required!


## Elliptic Curves

The basic idea...


## Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields

General formula for "Elliptic Curves over $Z_{p}$ " ( $p$ is prime): $E_{p}(a, b)$ is the set of points $(x, y)$ satisfying $y^{2} \equiv x^{3}+a x+b(\bmod p)$

Technical requirement for $a$ and $b: 4 a^{3}+27 b^{2} \equiv 0(\bmod p)$

|  | Points in $E_{5}(2,1) \quad\left(y^{2} \equiv x^{3}+2 x+1(\bmod 5)\right)$ |  | Points |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Squares in $\mathrm{Z}_{5}$ | $\mathrm{x}=0$ : | $\begin{aligned} & y^{2}=x^{3}+2 x+1 \bmod 5=1 \\ & y=1 \text { or } 4 \text { (see table on left) } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| $1^{2}=1$ | $x=1$ : | $y^{2}=x^{3}+2 x+1 \bmod 5=1+2+1=4$ | (0,1) |
| $2^{2}=4$ |  | $y=2$ or 3 | $(0,4)$ |
| $3^{2}=4$ | $x=2$ : | $y^{2}=x^{3}+2 x+1 \bmod 5=8+4+1=3$ (no sol'n) | (1,2) |
| $4^{2}=1$ |  |  | $(1,3)$ $(3,2)$ |
|  | $x=3$ : | $\begin{aligned} & y^{2}=x^{3}+2 x+1 \bmod 5=27+6+1=4 \\ & y=2 \text { or } 3 \end{aligned}$ | $(1,2)$ $(3,3)$ |
|  | $x=4$ : | $y^{2}=x^{3}+2 x+1 \bmod 5=64+8+1=3($ no sol'n $)$ |  |

## Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields

General formula for "Elliptic Curves over $Z_{p}$ " ( $p$ is prime): $E_{p}(a, b)$ is the set of points $(x, y)$ satisfying $y^{2} \equiv x^{3}+a x+b(\bmod p)$

Technical requirement for $a$ and $b: 4 a^{3}+27 b^{2} \equiv 0(\bmod p)$

## Important points

- Can add points as before (no sensible picture, however)
- For a point $P$, can calculate
- 2* $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{P}+\mathrm{P}$
$3^{*} P=P+P+P$
- $4^{*} \mathrm{P}=\mathrm{P}+\mathrm{P}+\mathrm{P}+\mathrm{P}$
(eventually repeats $\rightarrow \mathrm{P}$ generates a cyclic group)
- Notation is multiplying rather than powering, but can do Diffie-Hellman!

Important: Discrete logs seem to be harder to compute for Elliptic Curves than $\boldsymbol{Z}_{\rho}$ - Consequence: Elliptic Curves can use shorter numbers/keys than standard Diffie-Hellman - so faster and less communication required!

## Revisiting Key Sizes <br> From NIST publication 800-57a

Issue: PK algorithms based on mathematical relationships, and can be broken with algorithms that are faster than brute force.

We spent time getting a feel for how big symmetric cipher keys needed to be $\rightarrow$ How big do keys in a public key system need to be?

| Table 2: Comparable strengths |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| From NIST pub 800-57a: | Security <br> Strength | Symmetric <br> key <br> algorithms | FFC <br> (e.g., DSA, D-H) | IFC <br> (e.g., RSA) | ECC <br> (e.g., ECDSA) |  |
|  | $\leq 80$ | 2 TDEA $^{21}$ | $L=1024$ <br> $N=160$ | $k=1024$ | $f=160-223$ |  |
| 112 | 3 TDEA | $L=2048$ <br> $N=224$ | $k=2048$ | $f=224-255$ |  |  |
|  | 128 | AES-128 | $L=3072$ <br> $N=256$ | $k=3072$ | $f=256-383$ |  |
| 192 | AES-192 | $L=7680$ <br> $N=384$ | $k=7680$ | $f=384-511$ |  |  |
| 256 | AES-256 | $L=15360$ <br> $N=512$ | $k=15360$ | $f=512+$ |  |  |

