CSC 580 Cryptography and Computer Security

Cryptographic Hash Functions (Chapter 11)

March 22 and 27, 2018

Overview

Today:

- Quiz (based on HW 6)
- Graded HW 2 due
- Grad/honors students: Project topic selection due
- Discuss cryptographic hash functions (today and next Tuesday)

Next:

- Complete homework 7 (due Tuesday, March 27)
- Read Sections 12.1-12.6 before next Thursday

Hash Function Basics and Terminology

General Definition: A <u>hash function</u> maps a large domain into a small, fixed-size range. Domain often generalized to all binary strings.

H:
$$\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow R$$

Fixed size range

Use in data structures: R is set of hash table indices.

Important properties:

- Efficient to compute
- Uniform distribution ("apparently random")

If H(x)=h, then we say "x is a **preimage** of h"

If $x \neq y$, but H(x) = H(y), then the pair (x,y) is a <u>collision</u>

<u>Question</u>: Do all hash functions have collisions?

Cryptographic Hash Functions

Cryptographic hash functions map to fixed-length bit-vectors, sometimes called **message digests**.

 $H: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$

For cryptographic applications, need one or more of these properties:

- Preimage resistance: Given h, it's infeasible to find x such that H(x)=h
 Also called the "one-way property"
- Second preimage resistance: Given x, it's infeasible to find $y \neq x$ such that H(x)=H(y)
 - Also called "weak collision resistance"
- Collision resistance: It's infeasible to find any two x and y such that x ≠ y and H(x)=H(y)
 - Also called "strong collision resistance"

The SHA Family of Algorithms

SHA is the "Standard Hash Algorithm"

Table 11.3 from the textbook:


Algorithm	Message Size	Block Size	Word Size	Message Digest Size
SHA-1	< 2 ⁶⁴	512	32	160
SHA-224	< 2 ⁶⁴	512	32	224
SHA-256	< 2 ⁶⁴	512	32	256
SHA-384	< 2 ¹²⁸	1024	64	384
SHA-512	< 2 ¹²⁸	1024	64	512
SHA-512/224	< 2 ¹²⁸	1024	64	224
SHA-512/256	< 2 ¹²⁸	1024	64	256

Note: MD5 is an older algorithm with a 128-bit digest - don't use MD5 or SHA-1.

Thinking about Collisions

If hashing *b*-bit inputs to *n*-bit digests, how many preimages per digest?

- Worst case ("at least *c* preimages for some digest...")?
- On average?



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For worst case:

If there are *m* items to be put into *n* bins, then one bin must contain at least $\lceil m/n \rceil$ items (generalization of the pigeonhole principle).

 2^{b} preimages "placed in" 2^{n} preimage bins

→ One digest must have at least $\lceil 2^{b}/2^{n} \rceil = 2^{b-n}$ preimages

Thinking about Collisions

If hashing *b*-bit inputs to *n*-bit digests, how many preimages per digest?

- Worst case ("at least *c* preimages for some digest...")?
- On average?

For average case:

Let p_h be the number of preimages for hash value (digest) h.

Since each of the 2^b preimages is the preimage to exactly one digest,

$$\sum_{h} p_h = 2^b.$$

The average number of preimages for any digest is therefore

$$\frac{\sum_{h} p_h}{2^n} = \frac{2^b}{2^n} = 2^{b-n}$$

Thinking about Collisions Some real numbers

Using SHA-1 to hash 256-bit (32-byte) inputs:

→ A digest has on average $2^{256-160} = 2^{96}$ different preimages

Bottom line: Lots and lots and lots and lots of collisions!

Looking for 2⁹⁶ needles in a size 2²⁵⁶ haystack still is hard...

MD5 was introduced in 1992

- Not a single collision found until 2004
- Now finding collisions in MD5 is fairly routine

SHA-1 was introduced in 1995

- Not a single collision found until... Feb 23, 2017
- Recommendations to not use since 2010
- Don't use any more!

Brute Force Attacks

On Preimage and Second Preimage Resistance

Brute force attack to find a preimage:

If *H* is uniformly distributed: prob $1/2^n$ of finding preimage each time

This is a Bernoulli trial with success probability 1/2ⁿ

- → Repeat until success gives a geometric distribution
- → Expected number of trials is 2^n

<u>Question</u>: What about a brute force attack to find a second preimage?

Brute Force Attacks

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<u>Question</u>: What about a brute force attack to find a second preimage?

<u>Answer</u>: Same analysis... expected number of test hashes is 2^n

Brute Force Attacks

On Collision Resistance

Free to match up *any* two preimages for a collision, so:

```
S ← {}
while true:
    x ← random input
    if a pair (y,H(x)) is in S with y ≠ x then
        return (x,y)
    Add (x,H(x)) to S
```

Looking for any duplicate pair is the "Birthday Problem"

- \rightarrow Picking randomly from *m* items
- → Expect a duplicate after $\approx \sqrt{m}$ selections
- → For *n*-bit hash function, collision after $\approx 2^{n/2}$ random tests

<u>Question</u>: Given what you know about feasible/borderline/safe times for attacks, what digest size do you need to be safe against brute force against each property?

Attacks via Cryptanalysis

Idea: Use structure of hash function - don't just guess randomly!

Success of a cryptanalytic attack is measured by how much faster it is than brute force.

Good summary on Wikipedia "Hash function security summary" page:

	Preimage Resistance		Collision Resistance	
Algorithm	Best Attack	Brute Force	Best Attack	Brute Force
MD5	2 ^{123.4}	2 ¹²⁸	2 ¹⁸	2 ⁶⁴
SHA-1	No attack	2 ¹⁶⁰	2 ^{63.1}	2 ⁸⁰
SHA-256	No attack	2 ²⁵⁶	No attack	2 ¹²⁸

"*No attack*" means no attack is known that substantially improves upon brute force for the full-round version of the hash function.

Application 1: Password Storage

Problem: Need to store passwords in a database for checking logins

Goal: Passwords are checkable, but can't be stolen if DB compromised

Idea: Don't store *password* - store *H*(*password*)

What property of cryptographic hash functions must be satisfied?

Preimage resistance?

Second preimage resistance?

Collision resistance?

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Preimage resistance? **Yes**

Second preimage resistance? No

Collision resistance? No

Application 1: Password Storage

Additional issues with password storage:

Issue 1: Would be easy to make a dictionary of hashes of popular passwords.

Solution: Add "salt" - random values prepended to password before hashing

- Like an IV must be stored with hash
- If set of salts is 10¹⁵ or larger, destroys possibility of dictionaries see why?

Issue 2: Given salt and hash, can brute force password (hash fns are fast!)

Solution: Purposely slow down hash function by iterating

- Compute H(H(H(H(...H(salt+password)...))))
- Using SHA256, can hash around 10,000,000 passwords/second
- Iterate 1,000,000 times to slow down to 0.1 seconds per test

Question 1: How long to test 1,000,000 most common passwords with SHA256?

<u>Question 2</u>: What about with iterated SHA256?

Application 2: Detecting File Tampering

<u>Problem</u>: Detect if a file has been modified without a copy of original

Goal: Can check if file is the original from a "fingerprint"

Idea: Store *H*(*file*) as fingerprint - for any file, SHA256(*file*) just 32 bytes

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What property of cryptographic hash functions must be satisfied?

Preimage resistance? No

Second preimage resistance? **Yes**

Collision resistance? No

Practical note:

Can't store hashes with files without additional protections!

Application 3: Verifying a message

<u>Problem</u>: I give you a contract, you verify what you agreed to with fingerprint of contract.

Example: Bank calls and asks "Did you agree to fingerprint xybqasd?"

Goal: I can't trick you into verifying a different contract than you saw

What property of cryptographic hash functions must be satisfied?

Preimage resistance?

Second preimage resistance?

Collision resistance?

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Preimage resistance? No	Practical note:	
Second preimage resistance? Yes	Seems esoteric, but this is precisely what happened when an MD5-based certification authority was compromised in 2008	
Collision resistance? Yes		

Relation Between Different Properties

Some basic questions

- Does a function with collision resistance have second preimage resistance?
- Does a function with second preimage resistance have preimage resistance?
- Can you construct a function with preimage resistance but not collision resistance?

These questions will be explored in your next homework!

A sampling of other applications

Hash functions have been used for:

- Fast, secure pseudorandom number generation
- Disk deduplication
 - Similar: content-addressable storage as in Dropbox
- Forensic analysis (hashes of known files)
- Commitment protocols (commit to a value and reveal later)


A new(-ish) application with a different property - proof of work

- Partial preimage: A preimage in which only part of the digest bits match
 - Example: Find SHA1 preimage in which first 40 bits of hash are 0
 - Should not be able to do this faster than 2⁴⁰ tests on average
 - Smaller match requirement makes problem tractable still hard though!
- Problem: Find x such that H(x || message) starts with b 0-bits
 - Invest time in finding x changing message requires similar time
 - Link to future messages changing a past message now *very* expensive
 - This is the key concept behind Bitcoin mining and blockchain integrity

Classical hash function construction


Merkle-Damgard construction

Used in MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512, ...



Classical hash function construction

Repeating compression function for long inputs



Input given in blocks of b-bits...

Notice that internal state is completely given in output if you stop early - this causes a problem with some later constructions, such as creating message authentication codes (MACs).


SHA-3

SHA-3 was selection process similar to that used for AES

- Competition announced/started in 2006
- Context: Attacks had been made on MD4, SHA-0, and MD5, as well as on general structure try to avoid "all designs alike"
 - From the competition announcement: "NIST also desires that the SHA-3 hash functions will be designed so that a possibly successful attack on the SHA-2 hash functions is unlikely to be applicable to SHA-3."
- Selection after rounds of proposal/evaluate/narrow rounds
 - 51 submissions!
 - 14 hash functions selected for round 2 in 2009
 - 5 finalists selected in 2010
 - Winner was named Keccak announced in 2012
 - Designed by Guido Bertoni, Joan Daemen, and Michaël Peeters, and Gilles Van Assche
 Recognize this name?

SHA-3

Based on a "sponge function" (not Merkle-Damgard): Input is "absorbed" into the sponge - output is "squeezed out"



Notice: state include "unused capacity" bits (c) - can't recover internal state to continue from output.