
CSC 580 Cryptography and Computer Security

Digital Signatures (Sections 13.1, 13.2, 13.4, 13.6)


Digital Signatures - Idea

Public key encryption idea



Digital Signatures - Idea

Digital signature idea



Digital Signatures - How it Works

Signature scheme consists of three algorithms:

- *Generate keypair*: Given keylength (security param) gives (PU,PR)
- Sign: Takes message M and PR, and produces signature sig
- <u>Verify</u>: Takes M, PU, and sig, and outputs true (verified) or false

Like public key encryption, sign/verify operations are slow!

- So don't run entire (possibly long) message through functions
- First hash, then sign H(M)

Is this combination secure? Yes! Why: Assume adversary knows valid sigs (M_1, sig_1) , (M_2, sig_2) , ..., (M_n, sig_n) and can find a forgery (M, sig).

- If $H(M) = H(M_i)$ for some $M_i \rightarrow$ found a collision in H, should be impossible!
- If $H(M) \neq H(M_i)$ for all $M_i \rightarrow then (H(M), sig)$ is a forger for sig scheme

Digital Signatures - Security Model

```
A<sup>S</sup>(PU)
  // Arbitrary precomputation
  while (not done):
    m = // compute query message
    s = S(m)
    Known = Known U (m,s)
    // More computing
  (m', s') = // compute claimed forgery
  Return (m',s')
```

Adversary wins if there is no pair (m',x) in Known and Verify(m',s') = true

Note:

- Adversary picks oracle query messages, and can adapt as it learns
 - That makes this an "adaptive chosen message" attack
- Any valid signature wins only restriction is that m' hasn't been queried
 - That makes this an "existential forgery attack"

Security is Existentially Unforgeable under Adaptive Chosen Message Attack (EUF-CMA)

EIGamal

As in Diffie-Hellman, let *p* be a prime and *g* be a primitive root

Key Generation

- 1. Pick random $PR \in \{2, ..., p-1\}$
- Note similarity to Diffie-Hellman

- 2. Compute $PU = g^{PR} \mod p$
- 3. Private (signing) key is *PR*; Public (verification) key is *PU*

Signing a message M

- 1. Pick random $k \in \{2, ..., p-1\}$ that is relative prime to (p-1)
- 2. Compute $r = g^k \mod p$
- 3. Compute $k^{-1} \mod (p-1)$
- 4. Compute $s = k^{-1} (H(M) PR^*r) \mod (p-1)$
- 5. Signature is the pair (r,s)

Verifying a signature (*r*,*s*) on message M:

1. Check if $g^{H(M)} \equiv PU^r * r^s \pmod{p}$ [accept if true, reject if false]

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Observation: Expensive computations (powering and inverse), but they don't depend on M - precompute!

Verifying a signature (r,s) on message M:

1. Check if $g^{H(M)} \equiv PU^r * r^s \pmod{p}$ [accept if true, reject if false]

Why does this work for valid sigs?

Important math fact: If $x \equiv y \pmod{p-1}$ then $a^x \equiv a^y \pmod{p}$.

<u>Proof</u>: If $x \equiv y \pmod{p-1}$ then there exists a k such that $x-y = k^*(p-1)$, so $x = k^*(p-1)+y$. Then $a^x = a^{k^*(p-1)+y} = a^{k^*(p-1)*}a^y = (a^{p-1})^{k*}a^y$. By Fermat's Little Theorem, we know that $a^{p-1} \mod p = 1$, so $(a^{p-1})^{k*}a^y \mod p = a^y$. Therefore $a^x \equiv a^y \pmod{p}$.

What this means: To simplify $a^{formula}$, can simplify $formula \mod (p-1)$.

Applying this to ElGamal formulas:

$$PU = g^{PR} \mod p$$
$$s = k^{-1} (H(M) - PR^*r) \mod (p-1)$$

Consider $PU^r * r^s \equiv g^{PR^*r} g^{k^*s} \equiv g^{PR^*r+k^*s}$ (mod p), and simplify exponent mod (p-1):

$$PR^*r + k^*s \equiv PR^*r + k^*k^{-1} (H(M) - PR^*r) \equiv PR^*r + H(M) - PR^*r \equiv H(M) \mod (p-1)$$

Therefore, $PU^r * r^s \equiv g^{H(M)} \pmod{p}$

DSA - Digital Signature Algorithm

Compared to ElGamal

<u>ElGamal</u>

Let q = p-1

Key Generation

- 1. Pick random $PR \in \{2, ..., q\}$
- 2. Compute $PU = g^{PR} \mod p$
- 3. Private key is *PR*; Public key is *PU*

Signing a message M

- 1. Pick rand $k \in \{2, ..., q\}$ with gcd(k,q)=1
- 2. Compute $r = g^k \mod p$
- 3. Compute $k^{-1} \mod q$
- 4. Compute $s = k^{-1} (H(M) PR^*r) \mod q$
- 5. Signature is the pair (r,s)

Verifying signature (*r*,*s*) on message M:

1. Check if $g^{H(M)} \equiv PU^r * r^s \pmod{p}$

DSA

q is prime such that q|p-1, and let g be a value with order $q [g^q \equiv 1 \pmod{q}]$

Key Generation

- 1. Pick random $PR \in \{2, ..., q\}$
- 2. Compute $PU = g^{PR} \mod p$
- 3. Private key is PR; Public key is PU

Signing a message M

- 1. Pick rand $k \in \{2, ..., q-1\}$
- 2. Compute $r = (g^k \mod p) \mod q$
- 3. Compute $k^{-1} \mod q$
- 4. Compute $s = k^{-1} (H(M) + PR^*r) \mod q$
- 5. Signature is the pair (r,s)

Verifying signature (*r*,*s*) on message M:

- 1. Compute $w = s^{-1} \mod q$
- 2. Check if $r \equiv (PU^{r^*w} * g^{H(M)^*w} \mod p) \mod q$

DSA - The Digital Signature Algorithm History, Parameters, etc.

One component of NIST's Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

- DSS was adopted in 1993
- DSA dates back to 1991
- One goal: Only support integrity not confidentiality
 - Why? Export restrictions!
 - Alternative signature scheme: RSA also an encryption algorithm

Key and Parameter Sizes:

- ElGamal is similar to Diffie-Hellman modulus size (N = number of bits)
 - 1024-bit p was OK in 1990s now suggest 2048-bit or 3072-bit
 - Signature two N-bit values (e.g., two 1024-bit values)
- DSA uses a computationally-hard subgroup
 - In 1990's q was 160 bits (matching SHA1!)
 - Signature was then two 160-bit values (more compact than ElGamal)
 - Now suggest q being 256 bits

Reminder - RSA Algorithm

From Public Key Encryption chapter

Key Generation:

```
Pick two large primes p and q
```

Calculate
$$n=p^*q$$
 and $\phi(n)=(p-1)^*(q-1)$

Pick a random
$$e$$
 such that $gcd(e, \phi(n))$

Compute
$$d = e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$$
 [Use extended GCD algorithm!]

Public key is
$$PU=(n,e)$$
; Private key is $PR=(n,d)$

Encryption of message $M \in \{0,..,n-1\}$:

$$E(PU,M) = M^e \mod n$$

Decryption of ciphertext $C \in \{0,..,n-1\}$:

$$D(PR,C) = C^d \bmod n$$

Correctness - easy when gcd(M,n)=1:

$$D(PR,E(PU,M)) = (M^e)^d \bmod n$$

$$= M^{ed} \mod n$$

$$= M^{k\phi(n)+1} \mod n$$

$$= (M^{\phi(n)})^k M \mod n$$

$$= M$$

Also works when $gcd(M,n)\neq 1$, but slightly harder to show...

RSA Algorithm for Signatures

"Textbook algorithm" - not how it's really done

Key Generation:

```
Pick two large primes p and q
Calculate n=p^*q and \phi(n)=(p-1)^*(q-1)
Pick a random v such that \gcd(v,\phi(n))
Compute s=v^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)} [Use extended GCD algorithm!]
Public key is PU=(n,v); Private key is PR=(n,s)
```

```
Signing message M \in \{0,..,n-1\}:
Sign(PR,M) = M^s \mod n
```

```
Verification of signature \sigma \in \{0,...,n-1\}:
Verify(PU,M,\sigma): Check if M = \sigma^v \mod n
```

RSA-PSS (Probabilistic Signature Scheme)

How it's really done - with padding (similar to OAEP for encryption)




Figure 13.6 RSA-PSS Encoding

Invented (and proved secure) by Bellare and Rogaway

 Also inventors of OAEP and HMAC

Forging sigs w/ "textbook RSA"

- Pick random sig R
- Let message M=R^v mod N
- (M,R) is valid sig pair!

Modifying sigs ("blinding")

- Given $\sigma = M^s \mod N$
- Compute $X = R^{\vee} \mod N$
- Let M' = X*M mod N
- Let σ' = R*σ mod N
- Note $(\sigma')^{v} = R^{v}\sigma'^{v} = X^{*}M = M'$ (mod N)