Digital Certificates, Certification Authorities, and Public Key Infrastructure

Sections 14.3-14.5

Basic Problem

- · What does a public-key signature verification tell you? Verification parameters include public key, and successful verification says "Only someone holding the corresponding private key could have made this signature."
- What do you want a signature verification to tell you? Probably something like "Joe Smith signed this."
- · Problem: What assurance do you have that the public key really belongs to Joe Smith?

What is a Digital Certificate?

- · Associates an identity/properties with a public key - Identity can be person's name, website, e-mail, ...

 - Properties can be valid key uses, age of individual, access rights granted, ...
- · Signed by someone you trust
 - Signature is trusted party vouching for ID/key pair
 Role is similar to a notary public
- · Some typical properties of certificates:
 - Good for a set time (validity period)
 - Must get a new certificate after expiration
 - Certificates may be revoked

More on Certificates

- · Common types of certificates:
 - X.509 standard (version 3)
 - PGP certificates
- · Who signs certificates? Several possibilities:
 - Independent "Certification Authority" organization
 - · Disinterested third party company or government
 - Examples: Verisign, Deutsche Telekom, Entrust, AOL, ...
 - Internal (organizational) certification authority
 Organization controls certificates for employees or clients
 - Could be just an individual you trust
 - This is how PGP certificates are typically certified

X.509 Certificates

- · Most prevalent type of digital certificate
- · Related to X.500 directory services
- An integral part of the Web
 - All major web browsers and servers support X.509
 - CA "industry" (Verisign, etc.) built around X.509
- Also part of secure e-mail specifications
 S/MIME
- Currently "version 3" of X.509
 Includes a flexible "extension field" capability

X.500 Names

(Also called "Distinguished Names")

- · Hierarchical naming
- · Parts of names are attribute/value pairs
- Example attributes:
 - C=country
 - ST=state
 - L=locality
 - O=organizationOU=organizational unit
 - CN=common name

Important "Additional Information"

- · How does a CA state how they do business?
 - A Certification Practices Statement (CPS) is a human-readable statement of practices used by CA
 - · Based on this, a person/vendor may decide whether to trust or not trust the CA · Problem: What if CPS becomes a dead link? Trust the CA?
- · Where to obtain the Certification Revocation List (CRL)
 - Called a CRL Distribution Point (CDP)
 - Certificates may be revoked due to
 - Private key compromised
 Incorrectly issued certificate
 - CA compromised
 Properties change
 - CRL contains unexpired revoked certificates
 - Current (2018) size of Symantec CRL: 1,211,730 bytes (34,610 entries)
 - Newer technology: OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol)

Example: Amazon Certificate

(Extension fields removed)

Data: . Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number' 79;df:66:64:52:f6:6a:12:05:ac:c8:88:7b:0a:d5:8e Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=US, D=Symantec Corporation, OU=Symantec Trust Network, CN=Symantec Class J Secure Server CA - G4 s 3 Secure Server Un Conv Validity Not Before: Oct 6 00:00:00 2017 GMT Not After : Sep 21 23:59:59 2018 GMT Subject: CeUS, ST=Washington, L=Seattle, O=Amazon.com, Inc., CN=www.amazon.com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Info: Public Key: (2048 bit) Mndulus: ... [Deleted] Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

... Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption 1f:01:57:8d:2f:fe:26:bb:5d:43:59:5a:86:42:47:47:2f:5e:

Example: Amazon Certificate, Part 2

Extension fields

X509v3 extensions: v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:amazon.com, DNS:amzn.com, DNS:buybox.amazon.com, [...] X509v3 Basic Constraints: XS99V3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE XS09V3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment XS09V3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication XS09V3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.23.140.1.2.2 CPS: https://d.symcb.com/cps User Notice: Evolicit Text: https://d.symch.com/cpa USER NOTICE: Explicit Text: https://d.symcb.com/rpa X500v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:5F:60:CF:61:90:55:DF:84:43:14:8A:60:2A:B2:F5:7A:F4:43:18:EF X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://ss.symcb.com/ss.crl Authority Information Access: OCSP - URI:http://ss.symcd.com CA Issuers - URI:http://ss.symcb.com/ss.crt





Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

- · A PKI is "a collection of technologies and policies for creating and using digital certificates." [Garfinkel and Spafford]
- Many people originally envisioned an official digital ID system - In reality: Very little personal ID done with certificates - mostly used for server identification
 - Could change if security tokens or smart cards become more prevalent! Maybe smartphones?

Another Trust Model: PGP "Web of Trust"

- · PGP is "Pretty Good Privacy"
 - Originally for e-mail encryption/signing
 - Now regularly used for software verification
 - Originally written by Phil Zimmerman - Now several free and commercial versions

 - GPG ("Gnu Privacy Guard") is a Free-Software alternative (they use only free algorithms)
- Trust model is less hierarchical than X.509
- · I can sign keys and distribute them
 - Anyone who trusts me can use me as a CA!
 - Difference between "trusted" and "valid" keys

PGP/GPG Keyservers

- Problem: How do you get public keys?
 Note: In PGP public keys are always certificates
- Solution: Keyservers databases of keys
 You can submit your own keys
 - You can look up keys by name or e-mail address
 - Support integrated into many e-mail programs
- · Keyservers can be accessed in many ways
 - LDAP
 - HTTP
 - E-mail

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(*) 0 #	https://pp.keyserver.io/pia.fools.p?sarch=Schreier&Engerprint-onScop=index 🖾 C Q, Sarch 🖡 🏠 🏠 🖒 Tice Midden service	
	PGP Public Key Server http://home faq dump peers stats load	
	Search results for: Schneier	
	Type bits/keyI0 cr. time exp time key expir	
	pub 40000/ <u>47438228</u> 2017-01-25 Fingerprint-C674 2021 F384 5789 35F1 0108 1758 E186 42A3 8328	
	uid Janh Schweise - sembersker lock net- sig sig 312 322322 2017-01-25 2018-01-25 [sol [sig] sig sig 3233222 2017-01-25 2018-01-25 [sol [sig]]	
	wid josh Schweier -josh schweierhymail.com sig sig3 42438328 2017-01-25 2010-01-25 [selfsig]	
	sab 40968/45A1C203 2017-01-25 51g 501nd <u>42A38328</u> 2017-01-25 2018-01-25 <u>[]</u>	
	sub 40000/13A320C3 2017-01-25 sig sbind <u>42A38522</u> 2017-01-25 2018-01-25 <u>[]</u>	
	sub 40068/23812539 2017-01-25 sig sbind <u>42638528</u> 2017-01-25 2018-01-25 <u>[]</u>	
	pub 00008/02652503 2016-07-08 Fingerprint-A20C 3C85 08E9 F496 555F FCC8 FE08 FC06 5005 2E83	
	uid Zachary Sallaway Schneier (So it gees) eschneierz00cu.edur sig sig3 <u>20032022</u> 2010-07-00 [islfsig]	
	sub 00568/60889CF8 2016-07-08	











Some problems with certificates

- Private keys are not people
- Distinguished names are not people
- There are too many Robert Smiths
- X.509 v3 doesn't allow selective disclosure
- · Ubiquitous certificates could lead to privacy issues
- How do you loan a key?
- · Signatures are "brittle"
- But overall: Not perfect, but solves some important problems