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51. The three self-regarding arguments read: "The new proposal for an environmental classification system on trucks should be withdrawn because: (1) ... it will be a serious hit to the European [Swedish] hauliers industry; (2) ... it is unreasonable to sacrifice the hauliers like this, when it is obvious that the sources of air pollution are complex and thus are a responsibility for the whole society; (3) ... the European [Swedish] hauliers industry needs less trouble and cost burdens, not more." The public-regarding arguments read: "(1) ... the industry employs a lot of people directly and indirectly—jobs will be lost; (2) ... a vehicle tax is an ineffective means to reduce emissions from the transport sector; (3) ... the European [Swedish] economy is dependent upon letting companies have access to road transports at reasonable prices; (4) ... the system encourages cheating at vehicle inspections, which will be difficult to control; (5) ... the heavy focus on road transports prevents the search for a comprehensive approach to air pollution, which has many sources, ultimately hindering effective environmental protection; (6a) ... it will distort competition between the different modes of transportation, which will impede the implementation of an effective common market for freight transportation [Brussels]; (6b) ... measures against air pollution require cooperation on a European or global level, not unilateral Swedish rules [Sweden]."
52. Brussels IP 6.
53. Does the lack of a nonselfishness norm apply only to business lobbyists, who would have a harder time than many other actors (political parties for instance) in trying to hide the fact that they are "in it" for themselves? The answer is most likely not. Dale Miller, for example, shows evidence from psychological research that in America at least there rather exists a "norm of self-interest" that makes people uncomfortable admitting that they engage in politics for charitable reasons. Dale T. Miller, "The Norm of Self-Interest," *American Psychologist*, 54 (1999). Similarly, Nina Eliasoph found in her study on civic group activists in America that these activists were reluctant to justify their engagement publicly by referring to a public interest cause. They preferred to explain their motives for contributing to the groups in terms of personal gains. Nina Eliasoph, *Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). The assumption of deliberative democratic theory that justifying one's positions on the basis of egoistical reasons "is nearly impossible in the public sphere" (Risse, p. 22) seems to be empirically very weak.
54. Brussels IP 8.
55. Brussels IP 6.
56. Brussels IP 5.
57. Brussels IP 2.
58. Stockholm IP 6.
59. Brussels IP 4.
60. Stockholm IP 6.
61. Stockholm IP 7.
62. Stockholm IP 1.
63. Brussels IP 1.
64. See Putnam, George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
65. Stockholm IP 6.

Structural Reform, Democratic Governance, and Institutional Design in Latin America

Fabrice Lehoucq

Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael Shifter, eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, 2nd ed., Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.

Raul L. Madrid, *Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America and Beyond*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003.

Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, eds., *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Kurt G. Weyland, *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.

The radical shift in development strategy in Latin America to market-based reforms was a product of the 1982 debt crisis. In its aftermath Latin American economies stopped growing for most of the 1980s. Persistent balance of payments deficits, aggravated by fixed exchange rates, were the proximate causes of ten years of economic stagnation. Protection for domestic manufacturers was a structural factor that prevented countries from developing export industries able to finance growing volumes of imports. Unaccountable governments and political instability in many countries also were underlying structural weaknesses that contributed to the debt debacle. Because governments found it easier to contract debts from international banks (who were more than willing to recycle petrol dollars) than to build a political consensus in favor of raising chronically low tax rates, most countries of the region piled up public debts in foreign currencies (at unfixed interest rates). These debts became unsustainable by the 1980s.¹

Kurt Weyland's *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies* analyzes why Latin American presidents succeeded or failed to enact first generation structural reforms, policies aimed at restoring macroeconomic health in the 1980s. In general, first generation reforms focused on reducing inflation and reigniting economic growth. Weyland not only offers an explanation for why radical neoliberal experiments took hold or did not take hold in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela, but also challenges the use of rational choice to make sense of Latin American politics. Jorge Dominguez

and Michael Shifter's collection of essays, *Constructing Democratic Governance*, examines the political impact of market-based reforms in the region. Thematic and country-specific chapters analyze how well (or badly) political systems are building the political consensus to promote democratic consolidation.

Institutional design issues were relevant for effective social programs and second generation structural reforms—the strengthening of courts and regulatory bodies that improve economic competitiveness.² In *Retiring the State*, Raúl Madrid analyzes why the Chilean government privatized its social security systems while others did not. Disposition of old age pensions not only has fiscal implications, but also raises questions about how states should meet social obligations and be restructured to improve efficiency and competitiveness. The articles in *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, discuss the effectiveness of horizontal accountability in select countries of the region.

These books do little to suggest that, outside of a few cases, citizens and the state are collaborating to produce effective democratic governance or that the region is on its way to becoming economically developed. While virtually all Latin Americans live in formally democratic systems, most have good reasons to complain about the quality of their political systems.³ Even by the late 1990s, Latinobarometer surveys indicate that less than 40 percent of those surveyed were very or partly satisfied with democracy in their countries; only in Costa Rica and Uruguay do these percentages exceed 60 percent. In contrast, an average of 50 percent of the citizens of the fifteen countries of the European Union responds that they are very or partly satisfied with democracy.⁴ Despite two decades of reforms, development is as elusive as ever, even if macroeconomic and political stability now exists in most countries. By the end of the twentieth century, the average per capita GDP rate in the region reached about \$4,000 (in 1987 PPP US\$), barely doubling in more than fifty years. In the interim, average per capita GDP in the developed world has gone from about \$5,000 to nearly \$14,000.⁵

For critics of market-based reforms, these less than impressive results prove that development does not hinge upon free trade and markets. For neoliberals, unimpressive growth rates mean that Latin American societies need to deepen structural reforms. Just when the speed of reforms should pick up, however, surveys suggest that public opinion is turning against them.⁶ Whether neoliberals or their critics are right, these books suggest that governance—the construction of political consensus around short- and long-term goals and of institutions and procedures to implement them—suffers from serious ailments: drawbacks that prevent the enactment of the institutional and regulatory reforms necessary for democratic legitimacy and economic growth.

It is necessary to start integrating what remain four separate subfields of study: public opinion, the political economy of structural reform, democratic governance, and institutional design. Each is a core element of what should be the new political economy of the region, one concerned with identifying the electoral and institutional

constraints to development. Next, it needs to be explained why some institutional designs make governments responsive to voters' preferences and also build a consensus in favor of structural reform. Particular attention should be paid to Weyland's findings (and related work) on why public opinion became skeptical about more market-based reforms. More thinking is also necessary about better ways of measuring democratic governance, a concept central in measuring the overall effectiveness of political systems and in comparing and contrasting political system performance.

First Generation Structural Reforms

Why did several Latin American presidents liberalize trade, lift price controls, and privatize state companies, actions guaranteed to offend powerful interest groups? Why did voters accept the pain in some places, but not in others? In *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies*, Weyland argues that conventional rational choice approaches, based upon expected utility calculations, can not answer these questions. The probability of enacting these reforms is low or difficult to calculate, even if the political rewards for taming inflation are high. In these circumstances, the rational thing may be to do nothing.

Weyland borrows from prospect theory, a set of hypotheses developed by psychologists to explain counterintuitive behavior. If rational choice presumes that humans are incessantly calculating the risks and rewards of different options, prospect theory assumes that the costs of acquiring and processing information are high enough to turn humans into creatures of routines. Once they get used to responding to constraints in a certain way, they stick with their behavior, even if conditions have changed. In this situation the status quo or "prior option" becomes a powerful constraint on the present. If the prior option was well regarded, changes in conditions may make decision makers only stubborn defenders of the status quo.

Prospect theory hypothesizes that people react to their environment depending on whether they are in the "domain of gains" or the "domain of losses." In the domain of gains, they are risk-averse. They do not disturb the status quo because they fear the unintended and unknown consequences of change. If, however, a decision maker is in the domain of losses, he may actually become a risk-taker. If a crisis—defined as a highly probable but uncertain change of the status quo—is looming, decision makers may decide to take risks, even huge ones. Curiously, they may even become less risk-averse than is rational in an effort to escape from the domain of losses.

The Politics of Economic Reform in Fragile Democracies uses these insights to explain the failures and successes of market-based reforms. Weyland dissects the decision making of Presidents Carlos Saul Menem of Argentina (1989–99, two terms), Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (1990–92, impeached on corruption charges), Alberto Fujimori of Peru (1990–2000, two terms and a presidential coup in 1992), and Carlos

Andrés Pérez in Venezuela (1974–79, 1989–93, two terms). The first three were able to implement drastic reforms because their societies were experiencing hyperinflation. (In 1988 the inflation rate in Argentina was 387 percent; in Brazil, 1,037 percent; and in Peru, 1,722 percent.) In each case the president was able to use his office to build public support for radical economic reforms because enough citizens also believed they were in the domain of losses. In contrast, Pérez had to reverse many of these reforms because few Venezuelans accepted the president's argument that their country was very close to an economic crash. While inflation at 29.5 percent in 1988 was not low, it was not spiraling up. To his credit, Weyland uses narratives of reform experiences to shed light on expected utility and prospect theory approaches.

This book is powerful and provocative. Without abandoning methodological individualism—the theoretical stance that decision making must be comprehensible in the light of the tastes, preferences, and beliefs of individuals—Weyland offers a psychological and systematic account to explain counterintuitive political choices.⁷ In many ways, Weyland's use of prospect theory echoes the arguments made by Herbert A. Simon.⁸ Like Weyland's politicians and voters, Simon's firms "satisfice," or find a satisfactory way of doing things because incomplete information makes it too hard to calculate costs and benefits required by utility maximization.

Focusing on four cases privileges the sort of psychological factors that Weyland finds amenable, though the concluding chapter assesses the utility of his approach in a larger sample of cases from Africa, eastern Europe, and the rest of Latin America. His case would have been stronger if he had analyzed a larger number of cases and figured out how to operationalize difficult-to-measure concepts. Susan Stokes pursued this strategy in *Mandates and Democracy*.⁹ By examining forty-two elections in fifteen Latin American countries between 1982 and 1995, Stokes shows that highly competitive elections and institutionalized party systems discourage politicians from implementing neoliberal reforms. Similarly, Eduardo Lora and Mauricio Olivera, in a paper using a dataset of aggregate electoral returns, institutional features, and economic conditions from seventeen Latin American countries between 1985 and 2002, point out that incumbents who push pro-market reforms pay high electoral costs, even when such reforms improve macroeconomic performance.¹⁰ Both of these arguments are consistent with Weyland's and show how a quantitative research design would have complemented his case study approach.

Weyland shows that voters endorsed macroeconomic stabilization if they were in the domain of losses. More than 70 percent of those surveyed in Argentina and Brazil endorsed radical economic reform. Forty-nine percent of those surveyed in Peru supported shock therapy. Presidential approval rates remained in excess of 50 percent in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru even after presidents implemented shock therapy. Each of these countries was also suffering from hyperinflation. Weyland's principal indicator of whether a society is in the domain of losses. In contrast, Weyland's data show that Venezuelans turned against President Pérez's shock therapy and did not believe the president's claim that their economic problems would soon worsen. Inflation was only 29.5 percent. While these facts are

consistent with his argument, it would be useful to see the results of individual-level models showing that perceptions of inflation are statistically related to support for shock therapy. Whether social class or membership in the formal or informal sector mediates this relationship would also shed additional light on Weyland's arguments. Arguably, members of the informal sector should be more likely to support shock therapy because reducing inflation—even while cutting social benefits for the formally employed—would be in their interest.

Public opinion is the topic of Marta Lagos's chapter in *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*. She provides a synthesis of Latinobarometer, the region-wide effort to plumb public opinion she coordinates.¹¹ Her central message is that Latin Americans have a low opinion of their politicians. They also display low levels of interpersonal trust, which she believes limits democratic consolidation. Latin Americans also have the least confidence in parties and legislatures; less than an average of 10 percent of the population claim that they have "a lot of confidence" in these institutions. Latin Americans have the most confidence in the church; on average, about half of the respondents say they have a lot of trust in it. The armed forces come in second place with between 15 and 20 percent. The executive and judiciary do only marginally better than legislators and parties.

Lagos's psychological approach to public opinion, however, raises more questions than it answers. For example, Bolivians and Costa Ricans have the most pessimistic expectations of their own and their country's future economic performance, a truly bizarre finding given that GDP per capita rates are more than three times lower in Bolivia than in Costa Rica. Domínguez, in his conclusion to *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, also notes that there is no explanation why only 55 percent of respondents support democracy in Chile, while, the comparable figure in Uruguay is 80 percent. And while all can lament the low level of trust in the region, it is not clear that it is a cause of low quality democracy. In a paper she does not cite, Edward Mueller and Mitchell Seligson use data from a large number of cases to show that trust is more an effect than a cause of democracy.¹²

Nevertheless, something like Lagos's approach is necessary to make sense of why public opinion sometimes supports market-based reforms and sometimes does not. Broadly, this approach also emphasizes the theoretical implications of prospect theory. Information asymmetries and cognitive biases make for complex judgments that are not always in line with simple, neat models of rational behavior. Lagos suggests that expectations and core beliefs have something to do with why electorates sometimes trust their elected leaders and sometimes do not. Lora and Olivera call for this research agenda in their own effort to show that voters often turn against market-based reforms, even when the results improve aggregate economic outcomes and welfare, because they reject the allegedly immoral character of these policies.¹³ Public opinion research, of which there is too little, needs to help assess these and other claims. These research questions are important because the credibility of policy reform in a modern democracy requires the electorate's support. Electoral backing is the ultimate binding device for long-term policy change in modern democracies.

Discussions of electoral support for structural reform raise questions whether neoliberal reforms have been successful. Javier Corrales's chapter in *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America* suggests that the countries that timidly adopted the neoliberal agenda were the "worst performers" as far as economic growth and fiscal deficits are concerned. During the 1990s the aggressive reformers—Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Peru—had average annual growth rates of 4.48 percent. Intermediate reformers—Brazil and Colombia—had average annual growth rates of 2.5 percent. Shallow reformers—Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela—grew at an average annual percent of 2.66. Corrales argues that the neoliberal approach worked best when technocrats worked with politicians to strengthen states, especially by increasing bureaucratic competence and raising tax revenues.¹⁴

While this argument is good, it is hard to replicate its findings because Corrales does not provide criteria for classifying countries in these three categories. Thus, his classification of cases involves questionable judgments. Eduardo Lora's structural reform index, a systematic effort to compare structural reform efforts cross-nationally and longitudinally in Latin America, suggests that Mexico, for example, is not one of the region's aggressive reformers.¹⁵ Presidents Miguel de la Madrid (1982–88) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–94) radically liberalized international trade and privatized many small and money-losing state corporations.¹⁶ But neither they nor Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) nor Vicente Fox (2000–6) has been able to reform a forty-year old labor code. Nor did they open up the energy sector to private sector investment; a constitutional restriction makes Mexico's energy sector the most nationalist in the world. And no one has been able to raise chronically low tax rates (approximately 10 percent of GDP), a long-standing neoliberal objective typically requested by multilateral institutions like the World Bank. Petroleum exports account for roughly a third of total federal government revenues and leave the public oil company with little money for exploration and development. Without private sector investment in the energy sector or tax reform (or both), the Mexican state is squandering its oil reserves, which are not expected to last beyond fifteen years. Yet in these and other areas policymakers have been unable to build the consensus to continue reforming the Mexican economic and political system.¹⁷ Reform stagnation therefore explains why Mexico has always stayed below the regional mean on Lora's structural reform index and perhaps why its growth rates have not approximated those of Chile, a point that would have strengthened Corrales's own core finding.

Democratization and Governance

In a region where military and civilian regimes have often alternated, the consolidation of competitive elections is an achievement. Their consequences are a central preoccupation of *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*. This collection of articles examines the workings of democracy in seven countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,


Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) and progress on six issue areas (public opinion, presidentialism and representative institutions, market reforms, the military, labor, and women).

There have been very few coups since 1978, a point that Domínguez emphasizes in the concluding essay to *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*. Between 1978 and 2003 only one government has fallen because of a military or presidential coup (Fujimori in 1992 with implicit military support). Most governments have finished their terms in office, though 19 percent (fourteen out of seventy-four) of all governments during these years have not.¹⁸ John Carey, in his essay on presidentialism and representative government, observes that interbranch conflicts no longer end in military coups.¹⁹ Since the 1980s failed presidents have tendered their resignation before congress. This pattern is in marked contrast with earlier decades, when the threat of a military coup was ever present, either because the government (or factions therein) was planning to stay in power or because the opposition was conspiring with the military to obtain power. Between 1945 and 1982, 38 percent of presidential administrations (fifty-one of 133) ended their terms with a coup, while 62 percent (eighty-two of 133) ended their terms with an election.²⁰

As a result of democratization, the military's role in politics has changed. Rut Diamint's chapter on the armed forces in Latin America in *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America* notes that the military's presence in society has decreased in most countries. As a share of GDP, defense expenditures in Brazil and Colombia since the mid 1980s have increased only from less than 2 to 3.2 percent of GDP. On a per capita basis, defense expenditures have increased in these societies as well as in Chile and in Mexico. Unfortunately, as Diamint points out, civilian authorities of the region have still not developed effective ways of overseeing the military. The war on drugs, in fact, has expanded the internal policing functions of the military in many countries. All of these factors weaken the rule of law.²¹

Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America also puts a spotlight on governance, that is, the ability of governments to build consensus to solve fundamental economic and social problems. Judging from the essays in this book, only a handful of societies in the region are well governed. Most do not have systems of representation that foster accountability. Their policymaking is not very transparent. They do not develop a long-term consensus of the public interest to guide policymakers. In many cases private interests capture regulatory bodies and rule in favor of narrow interests. The rule of law in the region is mixed. This combination is depressing and makes citizens who are often poor or living near the margin enormously cynical about politicians and the political system, as Latinobarometer surveys indicate.

Figure 1 is a scatterplot of GDP per capita rates (with 2000 PPP rates) and a country's rating on the 2003 Bertelsmann's Management Index (BMI), a composite measure of the ability of a political system to reach agreements to solve governance problems.²² The simple correlation coefficient is -0.531 , suggesting that governance and economic development are related. It also shows that the countries with the best political

Figure 1 Governance and Level of Economic Development, circa 2000

Sources: See footnote 22.

systems are the ones with the longest democratic traditions. Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay tend to rank very high among 116 developing countries. So does Brazil, a country with a shorter history of democracy. Haiti is at the other extreme. Most Latin American countries are located between fortieth and eightieth position, indicating that they have serious governance problems, though many do not fall in the category of the worst run political systems in the world.

The country-specific chapters in *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America* examine both the better and the worse governed societies. Though there is no systematic comparison of the cases, the findings of these chapters are consistent with the BMI. The modal governance countries—those in the broad middle of the Bertelsmann's BMI Index—include Argentina, Colombia, and Peru. Steven Levitsky surveys the 1990s in Argentina, especially on the political fallout from the 2002 debt default. He argues that the economic collapse had little to do with political causes like clientelism and corruption.²³ Levitsky has a point. Both problems may be no greater than in Brazil and Mexico, and these two did not undergo a comparable crisis, even though Brazil (fourteenth) and Mexico (thirty-first) rank better on the BMI index than Argentina (forty-first). Yet

Argentina could not grow itself out of its economic recession because its currency board, which kept the Argentine peso overvalued at one peso to one U.S. dollar, undermined the country's ability to export itself out of recession. Unlike Argentina, Brazil devalued and improved the competitiveness of its exports. The currency board itself was a radical solution to the lack of credibility that the Argentine political system had and still has.²⁴

Governance is equally trying in Colombia and Peru, sixty-third and thirty-ninth on the BMI, respectively. Fernando Cepeda Ulloa analyzes the acceleration of civil war in Colombia during the 1990s. He also shows how the 1991 constitution failed to deliver on its promise to renew a closed, two-party system that contributed to the rise of insurgencies of the left and right. Cepeda Ulloa suggests that it has atomized the party system, politicized the judiciary, and brought about a fiscal crisis.²⁵ Carlos Ivan Degregori examines the 1990s in Peru. Originally elected in 1990, Fujimori closed congress two years later and established an electoral authoritarian regime, in which periodic controlled elections were held. Degregori traces the beginning of the end of Fujimori's government to his declining popularity in mid 1996. Fujimori's regime rapidly disintegrated after videotapes showing his shadowy security chief, Valdimiro Montesinos, bribing congressmen surfaced in 2000.²⁶

Brazil (fourteenth) and Chile (third) are the two relatively well governed societies covered in the book. Bolivian Lamounier credits Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) with developing quasi-parliamentary practices (using cabinet positions to cement oversized legislative coalitions) that improved governance in Brazil.²⁷ This point is important; Brazil's image as an ungovernable country appears to be changing.²⁸ As a result, the Brazilian political system was able to control inflation, reform fiscal federalism, and to begin modernize its public sector.

In his chapter on Chile, Felipe Agüero shows how democracy and political consensus have replaced polarization and authoritarian government in the 1990s. Chile stands out not only for having revived and strengthened its democracy, but also for growing at an average of 6 percent during the 1990s. Policy consensus has also led to tax reform, the decentralization of public administration, judicial reform, and progress on educational and health policy. The persistence of what Agüero calls an "incomplete transition" made for slow progress in eliminating military prerogatives. The 1980 constitution, written and approved during the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973–89), created a national security council to supervise the political system, non-elected senators, and military autonomy to name its own leaders and secure sources of funding.²⁹ In early 2005 (after Agüero's chapter went to press) elected officials eliminated most of these authoritarian vestiges. Agüero's chapter therefore provides background on key developments in one of the region's success stories, even if it does not explain why politicians forged a broad social consensus to enact key reforms and how these reforms are related to impressive rates of economic growth.

Mexico gets a BMI ranking of thirty-one out of 116 countries. It does better than the modal cases but not as well as Brazil and Chile (or Costa Rica and Uruguay).

Denise Dresser's portrait of Mexico in the 1990s does a good job of explaining how democratization transformed the country's politics but has not made Mexico a much easier country to govern. She points out that divided government complicates governance, especially since Mexico's separation of powers system fragments power virtually as much as in the U.S. political system. Unlike his predecessors, Vicente Fox can count upon less legislative support for his bills because no party, including his National Action Party (PAN), holds a legislative majority. Dresser also argues that the only partial existence of the rule of law undermines democratic governance in Mexico. Less than 5 percent of crimes, for example, result in conviction and detention. This result is due not only to government inaction, but also to a society that tolerates widespread violation of rules and social norms. Both inhibit the formation of a political consensus to advance second generation structural reforms.³⁰

Venezuela, examined by Michael Coppedge in *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, is the worst governed country, according to the BMI. By the late 1990s the failure to implement structural reforms resulted in economic stagnation and the disintegration of the old two-party system. In this context Chávez won the presidency in 1998 (after spending time in jail for a failed coup attempt in 1992), gained public approval for the 1999 constitution, and was reelected in 2000 under the new constitution. He retains the support of enough Venezuelans, even as he eliminated horizontal accountability in the country's political system. Coppedge's point is good: whether or not one likes it, Chávez has the political support that endows him with the power to design a state to suit his tastes. Venezuela nevertheless gets a low BMI ranking (eighty-eighth) because political and policy preferences have polarized and state capacity has declined.³¹

Governance is still a huge challenge, and it might be getting more complex. The book edited by Dominguez and Shifter might have addressed this issue more systematically. Though each chapter provides essential background material on countries and issues, without a set of common indicators it is hard for the authors to compare governance across cases or over time. The utility of the concept of governance—the construction of political consensus around short- and long-term goals and of institutions and procedures to implement them—depends upon the ability to identify indicators to measure its dimensions. The BMI presents the same contextual information as *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America* but places it in a framework that makes it much easier to test why some societies become governable and others do not.³²

Second Generation Reforms and Questions of Institutional Design

If first generation reforms focus on macroeconomic stabilization, second generation reforms focus on improving the longer-term prospects for governance and economic competitiveness. *Retiring the State* asks why some governments can privatize a major

government function, the administering old age pensions. The partial or complete privatization of pension programs involves the redesign of a major state responsibility and raises the question whether neoliberal approaches can better promote political consensus and social solidarity. Explanations of state effectiveness also require analysis of horizontal accountability—how the parts of government interact to ensure that elected officials and bureaucrats do not violate the public interest and the central objective of the essays in *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*.

Madrid's *Retiring the State* is a comprehensive study of why some governments (Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, and Nicaragua) privatized public pension systems, some (Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, and Uruguay) created private accounts to supplement public pension systems, and others (Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela) made no changes. Throughout the twentieth century Latin American governments established autonomous and semiautonomous bodies to administer this classic welfare state program. Few countries provided universal coverage: most established programs for public sector workers and other politically influential groups. By the late 1980s social security systems included more than 70 percent of the economically active population only in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay.³³

Madrid uses case studies and cross-national statistical models to test different arguments about social security privatization. The statistical chapters evaluating the impact of financial and political factors unusually follow the chapter-long case studies of Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. This way of arranging the empirical materials makes it harder to understand Madrid's overall argument, though this study is nevertheless a model of a solid research design. It is hard not to walk away impressed with the breadth of scholarship in *Retiring the State*.

Madrid argues that financial pressure and the search for domestic savings explain only a part of the variance between cases. If a pension system is mature, then the high costs of privatizing it will discourage governments from replacing publicly funded programs. If the domestic savings rate is low, then privatization looms as a way not only to divest government of an expensive social program, but also to generate capital to invest in the domestic economy. Governments with a legislative majority were also more likely to privatize. Another key variable was whether the country was the target of a World Bank pension reform mission. Each of these variables is significant in Madrid's probit models of eighty-two middle- and upper-income countries. Moreover, a regional dummy variable suggests that the Chilean model of complete pension privatization influenced its neighbors.³⁴

The case studies of Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil illustrate the causal dynamics behind social security privatization. In Mexico policymakers did not have to arrange for payment of an overly mature system. In the mid 1990s the Mexican pension system for private sector workers was still basically solvent, despite problems with contribution evasion over the years and the inability of past social security fund administrators to

invest surpluses for the future. As a share of public pension spending, it was only 0.4 percent of GDP in 1996. Zedillo's party also held a large majority in Mexico's bicameral congress, a condition that, Madrid argues, is fundamental in explaining why Mexico privatized so many pension systems. Finally, neoliberal economists held sway. The administration was headed by a Yale-trained economist who believed that privatization of a large and typically inefficient state could only help the Mexican political economy.

In Argentina and Brazil, wholesale privatization did not occur because most of these conditions were absent. As a share of public spending, pensions accounted for 6.2 percent of GDP in Argentina and 4.9 percent in Brazil in the mid 1990s. Any effort to privatize public pensions would have generated large transition costs, despite the efforts of influential neoliberal economists to champion the virtues of the Chilean model. Though Menem's administration held a majority in the Argentine legislature, Cardoso's in Brazil did not. Even Menem had to water down the bills he originally sent to the legislature because Peronist labor unions, formally part of the same *Justicialista* Party, balked at privatizing old age pensions.

Madrid's findings are important for several reasons. First, economic crisis, as measured by inflation or recession, does not lead to pension reform. Unlike first generation reforms, these reforms have diffuse long-term benefits and costs. Second, each of the case studies reveals that a key interest group in developed societies—pensioners themselves—was not a relevant player in pension privatization politics in Latin America. Only when pension system members belonged to powerful labor unions (Argentina) or public sector unions (Brazil and Mexico) did technocrats have to modify pension privatization bills. In Mexico highly organized public sector unions, whose members receive pensions out of all proportion to members' contributions, have thus far prevented reform of their pension systems.³⁵ The failure to reform these public pension systems, in fact, raises doubts about whether Mexico is a case of privatization. Third, the regional dummy variable picks up not only diffusion of the Chilean model, but also, with one partial exception, serious governance problems. None of the cases of pension privatization—including Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru—gets impressive marks from the BMI. Though the BMI gives Chile a high rating by 2003, its ranking would probably have been substantially lower in 1981, when its military government radically changed its old age pension system. Public pensions systems were often part and parcel of racketeering states that required (and still require) extensive reform. Technocrats, in fact, favor privatization because public pension systems are often rife with corruption, suffer from contribution evasion, and concentrate benefits—often out of central state revenues—in urban-based sectors. While it is fair to criticize pension privatization for reducing social solidarity, it is very much the case that public pension systems in many parts of Latin America were badly run and economically regressive.³⁶

Nevertheless, it is not clear that privatization has delivered or will deliver all of its alleged benefits. It has not had a noticeable positive effect on domestic savings rates.

Madrid points out that it is debatable whether the investment boom after privatization in Chile stemmed principally from this factor. Rates of evasion still remain worryingly high. According to a World Bank study, only about one-half of the economically active population is contributing to a pension system, whether public or private.³⁷ Lack of coverage may very well prompt electoral demands for the return of government-sponsored retirement schemes. Indeed, by 2001 Argentine central state politicians succeeded in getting fund managers to transfer private pension funds to central state coffers or to state banks. And once the Argentine economy crashed, the government simply stopped paying interest on these loans and slashed worker's contributions from 11 to 5 percent of their wages.

That the Argentine central government could raid private pension benefits to cover its expenditures suggests that checks and balances are not working in this country. Of course, this conclusion presupposes that the Argentine constitutional design, or the design of any presidential system, encourages the parts of government to check each other. Explaining how the branches of government stay accountable to voters as well as to other parts of the state is the central concern of Mainwaring and Welna's *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*. While half of the chapters map the conceptual terrain of accountability, the other half examines the performance of several institutions of horizontal accountability in selected countries.

Democratic Accountability in Latin America pivots around Guillermo O'Donnell's influential discussion of what he has termed horizontal accountability. According to O'Donnell, horizontal accountability is "the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful."³⁸ O'Donnell's point is that state institutions in Latin America are not very effective in curtailing the arbitrariness of executive authority. The legislature and the judiciary do not balance against the executive very well. Mandated institutions like comptroller generalships, ombudsmen, and the like are not very good in protecting against the abuse of power or in preventing corruption.

In their contribution, Erika Moreno, Brian Crisp, and Matthew Shugart dispute the usefulness of this conceptualization. They argue that accountability is a principal-agent relationship. There can be no accountability between horizontally equal institutions. They conclude that horizontal accountability does not exist because public prosecutors, attorneys general, and comptroller offices, to name a few agencies, often do not or cannot sanction elected officials, much less fire them. For these authors, the only accountability that exists in democracies is vertical. If the state violates rights and engages in corruption, it is because the relations of authority between voters and their servants are not working well.³⁹

Democratic Accountability in Latin America is interesting because the thinking of James Madison pervades so many of the contributions. Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart

explicitly draw on Madison to frame their discussion. If the trick, to paraphrase Madison, is to make the state accountable and effective, then many Latin Americans, they hypothesize, get bad government not because the institutions of horizontal exchange are inoperative, but because vertical accountability does not work. Latin American electoral systems fragment parties and make deputies little more than purveyors of favors to narrow constituencies or create centralized and unresponsive parties. Either way, this process discourages deputies (and senators in bicameral systems) from becoming interested in policy and making the legislature an effective overseer of executive and bureaucratic activities.

Vertical accountability may be improving in some Latin American countries. In his chapter in *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, Carey points out that several developments are opening up democratic politics. First, a few countries—including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia (after Carey's chapter went to press), Peru, and Venezuela—have reformed their constitutions to allow presidents to seek reelection and thus let electorates decide to reward or punish incumbents. Second, parties in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay now hold primaries to select presidential candidates. Both measures empower electorates to make more choices and thus make elected officials more responsive to public opinion. Third, legislative transparency has gotten better in some countries. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru now make roll call votes available (in whole or in part); citizens and watchdog groups can thus monitor the behavior of their representatives. Whether the countries that have democratized the most produce legislators who more actively police the bureaucracy is a hypothesis worth testing. It also goes to the heart of the dispute about whether dysfunctional states are a product of failures of vertical or horizontal accountability.

Regardless of one's position in the debate between O'Donnell and his critics, these conceptual chapters raise questions about institutional design. They build upon and mark an important point of departure from ongoing debates about executive-legislative relations. If this relationship is crucial for regime survival, then it becomes important to test theories about its impact on the code law that governs the way the bureaucracy, both in and outside of the executive, works. Analysis of how bureaucracies do or do not work will help show why many Latin American political systems are not promoting democratic governance. Moreover, analysis of the politics of institutional design will determine whether second-rate public bureaucracies contribute to interbranch conflict. After all, it is not uncommon to witness a reform-minded executive, one who claims to embody the national will, confront a legislature because it will not enact his program to reverse the accumulated effects of lawmaking on bureaucracies and the agencies of horizontal exchange.

It takes an uncommon combination of political conditions and institutional factors to create democratic accountability. The rarity of this combination may explain why democratic governance has not improved in very many countries of the region.

Scott Morgenstern and Luigi Manzi compare Argentine and U.S. political development to identify the conditions for the development of horizontal accountability. They conclude that public outcry for reform, along with divided government, encouraged career-minded legislators to develop accountability institutions to check the power of the executive in the U.S. These conditions were absent in Argentina until the 1990s.⁴⁰

It is not clear that constitutional framers and institutional reformers in Latin America have sought to borrow from Madison. The checks and balances version of the separation of powers makes two or more parts of government responsible for every function of government, based on the presupposition that shared responsibilities prevent tyranny. Although the 1853 Argentine and the 1857 (and even 1917) Mexican constitutions echo central themes of U.S. constitutional design, the Costa Rican and Uruguayan constitutional traditions, for example, do not. These constitutions seek to overcome the incessant conflict among the branches of government through functional specialization. Each part of government takes responsibility for one function of government. The establishment of autonomous electoral court systems throughout the twentieth century is one of the best examples of this type of statecraft. Though classical constitutional theory made the executive responsible for organizing elections and empowered the legislature to certify election results, the theory of functional specialization entrusts all electoral functions to independent agencies and courts. Electoral courts and other autonomous agencies therefore strike at the heart of the checks and balances version of the separation of powers.⁴¹

The development of the decentralized state sector, one formally outside of the central state that often includes health care, old age pensions, and monetary policy, remains an important part of the Latin American institutional landscape. Indeed, the best governed states in Latin America—Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay—create bureaucratic agencies largely outside of the central state to protect them from the partisan bickering of the elected branches of government. Only Chile privatized its pension system. Instead, Costa Rica and Uruguay chose to establish individual retirement accounts, as Madrid explains, to supplement public systems that autonomous institutes continue to administer. Is a new separation of powers that allocates each function of government to an agency of the state a better or alternative route in promoting democratic accountability?

In her chapter on the effectiveness of the Brazilian legislature in exercising oversight, Angelina Cheibub Figueredo makes the point that Madison may not be the best inspiration to make sense of horizontal accountability. Precisely because legislative majorities have formed coalitions to support the executive, in exchange for cabinet portfolios and other benefits, they can not effectively oversee the executive. In this institutional schema, horizontal agencies become vital ways of ringing the alarm bells when public officials violate the law.⁴²

Conclusion: Future Research Directions

The books under review raise fundamental issues about structural reform, democratic governance, and institutional design and offer significant findings. Several of them underscore the importance of public opinion in explaining the ebb and flow of structural reform. Weyland's *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies* borrows from prospect theory to explain that some presidents and voters endorsed orthodox economic reforms because they were in the domain of losses; that is, they believed that severe economic crises required drastic policy measures. An implication of Weyland's argument is that support for radical reform is temporary. Once economic conditions improve, voters may perceive themselves to be in the domain of gains and therefore become reluctant to back additional reforms.

One promising area for research, then, is to explore political attitudes toward economic reform and the political system. Weyland suggests that macroeconomic and democratic stability turns voters into supporters of the status quo. An implication of Susan Stokes's argument in *Mandates and Democracy* is that the constituency in favor of neoliberal reform is contracting because democratic elections are becoming increasingly competitive. Unlike Weyland, she does not focus on the cognitive constraints that voters face in backing or opposing market reforms because she has a more rationalistic conception of voters. While it is unsure if Stokes believes that voters are singularly retrospective, she does think that citizens will punish incumbents for betraying promises not to implement the Washington consensus. While Stokes and Weyland's arguments may be complementary, it is worth testing them against each other to explain the ebb and flow of market-friendly reforms.

Both of these arguments raise the issue why so many citizens in the region are suspicious of anything that smacks of market reform. Eduardo Lora and Mauricio Olivera suggest that Latin Americans have a general aversion to such reforms. Even politicians that reduce inflation only break even after discounting for the negative effects of being labeled neoliberals. Political scientists need to examine the psychology of antiliberal behavior and to locate its class, cultural, and electoral sources. Convincing voters to endorse reforms that seem to enrich a small segment of the population is not easy to do in societies with the highest rates of inequality in the world. For voters in economically uncertain situations, the promise of incremental improvements in some distant future is not enough to overcome the suspicion that such reforms serve only to maintain income disparities. The overall ill repute of the political system, as Marta Lagos and others reveal, also undermines the ability of politicians to make credible commitments about the future benefits of economic policy. With a handful of exceptions, politicians in Latin America are therefore unable to gain electoral support for reforms that economists say will promote economic development.

These books also point out that second generation reforms do not have much of a future, even if the newfound consensus in favor of macroeconomic and democratic stability

sticks.⁴³ Madrid argues in *Retiring the State* that only extraordinary political conditions (for example, executive control of the legislature) and economic conditions (for example, relatively low financial costs) empowered neoliberal economists to convince their governments to privatize their pension systems. The first condition is becoming uncommon with time, even if many second generation reforms (for example, labor reforms, additional privatizations, and legal and democratic reforms) do not generate as many financial costs upfront. Single party majority governments became a distinct minority between 1984 and the end of the 1990s. By 2000 more than 70 percent of all governments relied upon coalitions of parties in the legislature.⁴⁴

The rise of coalition government in most presidential systems and its impact on governance since the 1980s also requires explanation. If a virtue of presidentialism is that it promotes executive stability, then it is worth noting that recent research suggests that cabinets do not appear to be any less stable in parliamentary systems.⁴⁵ Related research shows that presidents, like prime ministers, consciously make cabinet appointments as part of their overall legislative strategy.⁴⁶ There may also be nothing new about what some call the "parliamentarization" of executive authority in Latin America. An earlier generation of research on Latin American political systems noted this parliamentarization, but it was lost with the turn to dictatorship during the 1960s and 1970s.⁴⁷

To determine whether the return of coalition cabinets helps or hinders governance, it is necessary to devise cross-national measures of this multidimensional concept. The BMI is an ambitious effort to code 116 developing countries on political inclusiveness, implementation of interparty reform agreements, and a host of related factors. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) also has underwritten a multiyear project to link the institutional features of a dozen Latin American governments with key characteristics of their policymaking regimes.⁴⁸ Systematic analysis of governance not only can chart progress, but also can test hypotheses about the way institutional frameworks and systems of representation interact to push countries into more advanced and self-sustaining development trajectories.

Finally, the books under review explore the impact of institutional design on democratic governance. The way different parts of the state are structured shapes the incentives for public officials to become accountable and therefore to promote democratic governance. The preliminary diagnosis in Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna's *Democratic Accountability in Latin America* is that horizontal accountability, or the effectiveness of checks and balances among the organs and agencies of the state, does not work very well in Latin America. O'Donnell suggests that the relations between the agencies of state government do not encourage them to supervise each other and therefore to advance the public interest. Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart suggest that better systems of representation would activate the checks and balances in separation of powers systems.

Again, systematic tests of these alternative arguments are needed to determine what institutional design best promotes democratic accountability in separation of powers systems. For all of the talk of horizontal accountability, there are very few tests of

how alternative principal-agent models improve the responsiveness of state officials. There is a reasonably large number of works on how Congress delegates authority to the bureaucracy and even some work on why presidents and Congress sometimes create independent agencies and some times do not.⁴⁹ Unfortunately, researchers have not yet developed criteria to measure the degree of autonomy of agencies from the executive or from the legislature. It stands to reason that the most continuously democratic countries should have the most responsive bureaucracies. Yet the use of the new separation of powers in so many countries suggests that mechanisms of horizontal accountability are key to explaining why the quality of bureaucratic services tends to be higher in Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay.

NOTES

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3. Programa de las Naciones Unidas Para el Desarrollo, *La Democracia en América Latina* (New York: PNUI, 2004).
4. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 164.
5. Inter-American Development Bank, *Development, Beyond Economics* (Washington, D.C.: IADB, 2000), p. 2.
6. Eduardo Lora, Ugo Panizza, and Myriam Quispe, "Reform Fatigue: Symptoms, Reasons, and Implications," *Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review* (2004), 1–28.
7. Rational choice approaches also can not explain all electoral reforms. See Fabrice Lehoucq and Iván Molina, *Stuffing the Ballot Box: Fraud, Democratization, and Electoral Reform in Costa Rica* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
8. Herbert A. Simon, *The Sciences of the Artificial*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).
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10. Eduardo Lora and Mauricio Olivera, "The Electoral Consequences of the Washington Consensus," *Economía*, 5 (Spring 2005), 44. Also, see Alyson Lucinda Benton, "Dissatisfied Democrats or Retrospective Voters: Economic Hardship, Political Institutions, and Voting Behavior in Latin America," *Comparative Political Studies*, 38 (2005), 417–42.
11. For an update, see "The Latinobarometer Poll: Democracy's Ten-Year Rut," *The Economist*, 377 (October 29, 2005), 39–40.
12. Edward Mueller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Quest for Causal Relationships," *American Political Science Review*, 88 (September 1994), 635–52.

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15. Eduardo Lora, "Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How to Measure It?" Research Department Working Paper No. 466 (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, December 2001).
16. Dag Maeland, *Downsizing the State: Privatization and the Limits of Neoliberal Reform in Mexico* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2005).
17. Fabrice Lehoucq et al., "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Mexico," Latin American Research Network Paper No. 512 (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2005).
18. Gabriel L. Negretto, "Minority Governments and Types of Presidential Systems in Latin America," *Latin American Politics and Society* (Fall 2006). Also see Kathryn Hochstetler, "Rethinking Presidentialism: Challenges and Presidential Falls in South America," *Comparative Politics*, 38 (July 2006).
19. John M. Carey, "Presidentialism and Representative Institutions," in Domínguez and Shifter, eds., pp. 11–42.
20. Barry Ames, *Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
21. Rut Diamant, "The Military," in Domínguez and Shifter, eds., pp. 43–72.
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23. Steven Levitsky, "Argentina: From Crisis to Consolidation (and Back)," in Domínguez and Shifter, eds., pp. 244–68.
24. Mariano Tommasi, Sebastian Galiani, and Daniel Heymann, "Great Expectations and Hard Times: The Argentine Convertibility Plan," *Economía*, 3 (Spring 2003), 109–60.
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26. Carlos Iván Degregori, "Peru: The Vanishing of a Regime and the Challenge of Democratic Rebuilding," in Domínguez and Shifter, eds., pp. 220–43.
27. Bolívar Lamounier, "Brazil: An Assessment of the Cardoso Administration," in Domínguez and Shifter, eds., pp. 269–91.
28. For a systematic discussion, see Octavio Amorim Neto, Gary W. Cox, and Matthew D. McCubbins, "Agenda Power in Brazil's Câmara dos Deputados, 1989–98," *World Politics*, 55 (July 2003), 550–78. Also see Lee J. Alston et al., "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Brazil," Latin American Research Network Paper No. 506 (Washington, D.C.: IDB, 2006).
29. Felipe Agüero, "Chile: Unfinished Transition and Increased Political Competition," in Domínguez and Shifter, eds., pp. 292–320.
30. Denise Dresser, "Mexico: From PRI Predominance to Divided Democracy," in Domínguez and Shifter, eds., pp. 321–350.
31. Michael Coppedge, "Venezuela: Popular Sovereignty versus Liberal Democracy," in Domínguez and Shifter, eds., pp. 165–92.
32. Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tommasi, "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions-Cost Approach with Application to Argentina," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 19 (2003).

- 281–306, develop a policy-based approach to measure governance. This approach is the basis of a multicountry study of governance and public policies in Latin America that the IADB organized between 2003 and 2005. For a summary of results, see Ernesto Stein et al., *The Politics of Politics: Economic and Social Progress in Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank and the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, 2006). See Alston et al. and Lehoucq et al. for studies of Brazil and Mexico, respectively.
33. Camello Mesa-Lago, *Changing Social Security in Latin America: Toward Alleviating the Social Costs of Reform* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 22. This figure includes both health care and old age pensions. The figure for old age pensions is probably smaller than this one.
34. See also Kurt G. Weyland, "Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform," *World Politics*, 57 (January 2005), 262–95.
35. John Scott, "Protección Básica, Cobertura Universal, Seguridad Social y Pobreza en México," *Bienestar y Política Social*, 1 (November 2005).
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37. Ibid., p. 100.
38. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Horizontal Accountability: The Legal Institutionalization of Mistrust," in Scott Mainwaring and Michael Shugart, eds., *Democratic Accountability in Latin America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
39. Erika Moreno, Brian F. Crisp, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "The Accountability Deficit in Latin America," in Mainwaring and Weha, eds.
40. Scott Mainwaring and Luigi Manzetti, "Legislative Oversight: Interests and Institutions in the United States and Argentina," in Mainwaring and Weha, eds.
41. Fabrice Lehoucq, "Can Parties Police Themselves? Electoral Governance and Democratization," *International Political Science Review*, 23 (January 2002), 29–46. For a more complete statement of this position, see Fabrice Lehoucq, "Constitutional Design and Democratic Performance in Latin America," *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, 39 (January 2006), 370–90. Also see Bruce Ackerman "The New Separation of Powers," *Harvard Law Review*, 113 (January 2000), 634–77.
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44. J. Mark Payne, Daniel Zovatto, Fernando Carrillo Flores, and Andrés Allamand Zavalla, *Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2002), p. 215.
45. See Cecilia Martínez Gallardo, "Designing Cabinets: Presidents, Politics, and Policymaking in Latin America" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2005). See also David Altman, "The Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multi-Party Presidential Democracies: The Case of Uruguay, 1989–99," *Party Politics*, 6 (July 2000), 259–83.
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Abstracts

Jacqueline M. Klopp and Elke Zuern, *The Politics of Violence in Democratization: Lessons from Kenya and South Africa*

While the relationship between attempted democratization and large-scale violence has been noticed, the way in which violence is produced has not been fully explored. Three mechanisms produce violence within the wider bargaining process over change: public order policing of protest by mobilized opponents of those in power, incumbent deployment of special forces, and the manipulation of local conflicts by national actors in the context of party formation. Different forms of violence can be used within bargaining to improve the position of one party over another or in some cases to derail negotiations. These mechanisms help to explain not only how large-scale violence escalates but also how it can dramatically deescalate to allow for a successful transition to a more democratic regime.

Benjamin Goldfrank, *The Politics of Deepening Local Democracy: Decentralization, Party Institutionalization, and Participation*

Causal analysis of why some recent experiments in participatory local government in Latin America have failed while others have succeeded is undeveloped. Comparison of three similar experiments in Caracas, Montevideo, and Porto Alegre can provide a more thorough explanation. The program in Caracas largely failed; Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting became an international model; and Montevideo's outcome was mixed. Two factors best explain this divergence: the degree of national decentralization of authority and resources for municipal governments and the level of institutionalization of local opposition parties. These conditions shaped the incumbents' ability to design meaningful participatory programs that could attract lasting citizen involvement.

Olena Nikolayenko, *The Revolt of the Post-Soviet Generation: Youth Movements in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine*

One of the most prominent features of the peaceful revolutions that swept Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine was the extraordinary upsurge of youth mobilization demanding fundamental political change. Comparative analysis reveals striking similarities in timing, issues, mobilization, framing processes, and action repertoires, in line with McAdam's distinction between initiator and spin-off movements. The interaction between political generations and political opportunities triggered the rise of the Serbian initiator movement *Opor* and set in motion a protest cycle. Shared concerns over