January 3, 2002.  True to its post-9/11 government-sanctioned role as US war propaganda headquarters, Hollywood has released "Black Hawk Down," a fictionalized account of the tragic 1993 US raid in Somalia.  The Pentagon assisted with the production, pleased for an opportunity to "set the record straight." The film is a lie that compounds the original lie that was the operation itself.

Somalia: the facts
According to the myth, the Somalia operation of 1993 was a humanitarian mission, and a shining example of New World Order morality and altruism. In fact, US and UN troops waged an undeclared war against an Islamic African populace that was hostile to foreign interests. Also contrary to the legend, the 1993 Somalia raid was not a "Clinton foreign policy bungle." In fact, the incoming Clinton administration inherited an operation that was already in full swing--planned and begun by outgoing President George Herbert Walker Bush, spearheaded by deputy national security adviser Jonathan Howe (who remained in charge of the UN operation after Clinton took office), and approved by Colin Powell, then head of the Joint Chiefs.

The operation had nothing to do with humanitarianism or Africa-love on the part of Bush or Clinton. Several US oil companies, including Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips were positioned to exploit Somalia's rich oil reserves. The companies had secured billion-dollar concessions to explore and drill large portions of the Somali countryside during the reign of pro-US President Mohamed Siad Barre. (In fact, Conoco's Mogadishu office housed the US embassy and military headquarters.) A "secure" Somalia also provided the West with strategic location on the coast of Arabian Sea.

UN military became necessary when Barre was overthrown by warlord Mohammed Farrah Aideed, suddenly rendering Somalia inhospitable to US corporate interests. Although the pretext for the mission was to safeguard food shipments, and stop the "evil Aideed" from stealing the food, the true UN goal was to remove Aideed from the political equation, and form a pro-Western coalition government out of the nation's warring clans. The US operation was met with "surprisingly fierce resistance"--surprising to US officials who underestimated Somalian resolve, and even more surprising to US troops who were victims and pawns of UN policy makers.

The highly documented series by Mark Bowden of the Philadelphia Inquirer on which the film is based, focuses on the participants, and the "untenable" situation in which troops were placed. But even Bowden's gung-ho account makes no bones about provocative American attacks that ultimately led to the decisive defeat in Mogadishu. Bowden writes: "Task Force Ranger was not in Mogadishu to feed the hungry. Over six weeks, from late August to Oct. 3, it conducted six missions, raiding locations where either Aideed or his lieutenants were believed to be meeting. The mission that resulted in the Battle of Mogadishu came less than three months after a surprise missile attack by U.S. helicopters (acting on behalf of the UN) on a meeting of Aideed clansmen. Prompted by a Somalian ambush on June 5 that killed more than 20 Pakistani soldiers, the missile attack killed 50 to 70 clan elders and intellectuals, many of them moderates seeking to reach a peaceful settlement with the United Nations. After that July 12 helicopter attack, Aideed's clan was officially at war with America--a fact many Americans never realized."

Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Somalis were killed in the course of US incursions that took place over three months. In his book The New Military Humanism, Noam Chomsky cites other under-reported facts. "In October 1993, criminal incompetence by the US military led to the slaughter of 1,000 Somalis by American firepower." Chomsky writes. "The official estimate was 6-10,000 Somali casualties [which would include those injured as well as deaths] in the summer of 1993 alone, two-thirds women and children. Marine Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni, who commanded the operation, informed the press that 'I'm not counting bodies . . . I'm not interested.' Specific war crimes of US forces included direct military attacks on a hospital and on civilian gatherings. Other Western armies were implicated in serious crimes as well. Some of these were revealed at an official Canadian inquiry, not duplicated by the US or other governments." Bowden's more forgiving account does not contradict Chomsky's in this regard: "Official US estimates of Somalian casualties at the time numbered 350 dead and 500 injured. Somalian clan leaders made claims of more than 1,000 deaths. The United Nations placed the number of dead at 'between 300 to 500.' Doctors and intellectuals in Mogadishu not aligned with the feuding clans say that 500 dead is probably accurate."

The attack on Mogadishu was particularly vicious. Quoting Bowden: "The Task Force Ranger commander, Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison, testifying before the Senate, said that if his men had put any more ammunition into the city 'we would have sunk it.' Most soldiers interviewed said that through most of the fight they fired on crowds and eventually at anyone and anything they saw." After 18 US Special Forces soldiers were killed in the final Mogadishu firefight, which included the downing of a US helicopter, television screens filled with the scene of a dead US soldier being dragged through the streets by jubilant Somalis. Clinton immediately called off the operation. US forces left Somalia in disgrace. Some 19,000 UN troops remained for a short period, but eventually left in futility.

The Somalia defeat elicited howls of protest and rage from the military brass, congressional hawks, and right-wing provocateurs itching for an excuse to declare political war on the "liberal" Clinton administration. The "Somalia syndrome" would dog Clinton throughout his presidency, and mar every military mission during his tenure. Today, as right-wing extremist George W. Bush occupies the White House, surrounded by his father's operatives, and many of the architects of the original raid, military fanaticism is all the rage. A global war "without end" has just begun. What a perfect moment to "clean up" the past.

Hollywood to the rescue
In promoting the film, producer Jerry Bruckheimer (who rewrote another humiliating episode of US military history with "Pearl Harbor") is seeking to convince Americans that the Somalia operation was "not America's darkest hour, but America's brightest hour;" that a bungled imperialist intervention was a noble incident of grand moral magnificence. CNN film reviewer Paul Tatara describes "Black Hawk Down" as "pound for pound, one of the most violent films ever released by a major studio," from "two of the most pandering, tactless filmmakers in Hollywood history (Jerry Bruckheimer and Ridley Scott)" who are attempting to "teach us about honor among soldiers."

More important are the film's true subtexts, and the likely emotional reaction of viewers. What viewers see is "brave and innocent young American boys" getting shot at and killed for "no reason" by "crazy black Islamists" that the Americans are "just trying to help." (Subtext one: America is good, and it is impossible to understand why "they hate us." Subtext two: "Those damned ungrateful foreigners." Subtext three: "Those damned blacks." Subtext four: "Kill Arabs.") What viewers will remember is a line spoken by one of the "brave soldiers" about how, in the heat of combat, "politics goes out the window." (Subtext one: there is no need for thought; shoot first, talk later. Subtext two: it is right to abandon one's sanity, morality and ethics when faced with chaos. Subtext three: when the Twin Towers went down on 9/11, America was right in embracing radical militarism and extreme violence, throwing all else "out the window.")

In the currently lethal political climate, in which testosterone rage, mob mentality, and love of war pass for normal behavior (while reason, critical thinking, and tolerance are considered treasonous), "Black Hawk Down" will appeal to the most violent elements of American society. Many who have seen the film report leaving the theater feeling angry, itching to "kick some ass." In short, the film is dangerous. And those who "love" it are dangerous. Considering the fact that Somalia is one of the targets in the next phase of the Bush administration's "war on terrorism," the timing of the film is no coincidence. As Herbert London of the Hudson Institute said of "Black Hawk Down," "I would never deny the importance of heroism in battle, but just as we should recognize and honor heroes, we should also respect the truthfulness of the events surrounding their heroic acts. In the case of 'Black Hawk Down,' we get a lot of the former and almost nothing of  the latter."

Larry Chin is a freelance journalist.

As most people should know by now, "Black Hawk Down" is a film about the US mission in Somalia to oust the warlord who is stopping all UN aid reaching hundreds of thousands of Somalians in a famine caused by years and years of civil war. The mission was during the Clinton administration and met with disaster when two helicopters were shot down, many of the 18 of the US' elite fighting soldiers were killed and one soldier was dragged through the streets. When these pictures hit the TVs in America, Clinton eventually pulled out the troops, their mission not completed.

I read a lot of reviews for this film before watching it, listened to a TV interview with Jerry Bruckheimer (producer), Ridley Scott (director) and Mark Bowden (the writer of the book from which the film takes its title and not the builder come professional golfer who lives in Germany) and expected to see a film that showed the "triumphant Americans", when as far as the mission went it was a disaster, and many of the facts completely incorrect. However, I have to say that the film in my opinion, did not show the American soldiers in the typical "we are best", "we won the war", etc. that we see in so many films. . . . As far as the facts go, i.e. the accuracy of the film, that was not important in this film. The facts are known; the Americans go in, two helicopters get shot down, 18 soldiers get killed, the film just deals with how this all takes place.

To the film itself then; the fighting scenes are realistic in that to me they seemed wholly believable and at times brutal. Some scenes are really shocking, particularly one where a medic and other soldiers, knowing that they can't be medivac out, search through a hole in a mans leg for an artery to stop him bleeding to death - definitely not nice. The cast is large, with some good performances from Josh Hartnett, William Fitchner, Tom Sizemore and Eric Banner. Interestingly enough also, is the number of British actors in the film, with Ewan McGregor and Ewen Bremner - this picture is clearly not him by the way reunited from Train Spotting and together with Jason Isaacs, have three main roles in the film; Orlando Bloom also has a small role.

Its not the type of film that you could say, "I really enjoyed that", but it is a good film. I am sure the will be some oscar nominations for it this year, I wonder if the academy will give it best film for patriotism, which would tell me that its all fixed anyway. Watch this film if you want to see drama, do not watch this film if you want to see a true account of the 1993 mission in Somalia and remember that this is not a film to enjoy!

"Black Hawk Down"
by David Perry

In the current climate, America might seem ready for a jingoist war film. Almost everyone seems to agree that "Behind Enemy Lines" failed to fill the gap, thus enters an earlier-than-planned release of Ridley Scott's "Black Hawk Down." "Black Hawk Down" was going to be Jerry Bruckheimer's 2002 release since he's already had his big Americana film this year, "Pearl Harbor." But in the wake of September 11, Bruckheimer and the studio flack over at Columbia deemed "Black Hawk" Down ready for mass consumption by a Middle America happily waiting for some flagrant flag waving on the silver screen. Though the film is surprisingly restrained when it comes to that department, "Black Hawk Down" does turn out to be little more than another overblown and self-righteous Bruckheimer effort. . . .

Ridley Scott . . . draws into emotions of characters--that is one of his biggest attributes, especially considering he works predominately in actions films; Bruckheimer, however, fills his productions with quick-cuts and formalized action scenes that veer on mindless impressionistic dancing. "Black Hawk Down," with the marriage of these two styles, is burdened by the pull from the two sides. I mean, Scott is far from a subtle filmmaker, but he is at least smart enough to keep from using Bruckheimer's board-to-the-head storytelling.

On 3 October 1993, American forces dropped into the city of Mogadishu, Somalia, in an attempt to raid a meeting of then rebel warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid's lieutenants. The raid, meant to last only a couple hours, turned into the bloodiest moment in American military combat since Vietnam. The Somalis were ready to stop the U.S. peacekeepers to ensure the promised future of reactionary fundamentalist Aidid. His agents made sure that the impending raid was known in Mogadishu long before the first helicopter of Delta Force soldiers arrived.

That single day had more importance on the U.S. military decisions of the last presidential administration than anything since Vietnam, including the Cold War. Clinton pulled out of various armaments, including Somalia, and cutback on the military. His wariness is understandable considering the massive carnage of Mogadishu, even if it meant that he would not send American forces to stop Osama Bin Laden in 1998.

Black Hawk Down never really points fingers at anyone being at fault, and, perhaps, that is its strongest attribute. But, at the same time, the filmmakers never allow themselves to take any form of a stance. This is found-art in the most opulent form--looking at the movie might leave some people angered at the nearby military brass (embodied by Sam Shepard's Major General William Garrison), the Washington decision makers (including President Bill Clinton, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin [who resigned in 1994], and Secretary of State Warren Christopher), or just the Somali people themselves.

Is racism running rampant in "Black Hawk Down"? Well, to a point, yes. In the black and white world of this film, everyone in Somalia seems to be on the side of Aidid. This, of course, was not true--Aidid was merely one of the many warlords trying to keep control of Somalia at that time. And in the military ranks, token Gabriel Casseus plays the only minority in the pack. Not only that, but he is also left to speak Spanish to take care of some Hispanic tokenism too.

But I digress on this subject. . . . My problems with "Black Hawk Down" are far more deeply centered on the screenplay by Ken Nolan and Steven Zaillian from the Mark Bowden non-fiction novel. This is a movie that literally throws character development to the wind--by the film's second act, it becomes clear that no character in the entire has been developed to a point that might create some dramatic tension or audience interest. Yes, we are humanly taken by carnage begat on human beings, but these are nameless faces without any real pretext. It's like a horror film that kills off only the secondary characters because the audience is hinged on the leads, just flipped around: no one in Scott's film has the audience's emotional investment and, for that reason, none of their possible demises really strike any cord beyond the automatic distaste for any death.

"Black Hawk Down" is a solidly made film, with fine editing from Pietro Scalia, cinematography from Kieslowski favorite Slavomir Idziak, music from Hans Zimmer, and direction from Scott. The movie is not a horribly made effort, even if the end product has some of the biggest problems found in a 2001 movie. Watching "Black Hawk Down" brings memories of "Saving Private Ryan" and "The Thin Red Line," just without the humanism and naturalism that reflected so beautifully from those two 1998 master works. This is the MTV-generation version--a boy's game of war, just with the grim results made clear. Josh Hartnett and Ewan McGregor (giving what could be the worst performance of his career) glean like Tom Cruise in "Top Gun," the flag waves clearly like "Pearl Harbor," and the story fails to invest anything in its characters like "Armageddon." Only Jerry Bruckheimer could ruin the cinematic visualization of Mogadishu.

Movie Review by David Perry, Copyright 2000.

That Somalia raid really was more a debacle than a victory.
January 21, 2002

"The October 3, 1993 U.S. raid on Somalia, in which 18 soldiers and two Black Hawk helicopters were lost, is often remembered as a tragic fiasco." —Wall Street Journal

"[I]t's not America's darkest hour, but America's brightest hour." —Joe Roth, head of Revolution Films, makers of "Black Hawk Down"

For years, the Rangers and Delta Force soldiers who fought the Battle of Mogadishu on Oct. 3, 1993, had a serious beef. Until the publication of Mark Bowden's 1999 book, Black Hawk Down , their daylight raid was widely perceived as a failure even in strict military terms. But the Rangers in fact succeeded in snatching and imprisoning the two Somali clan officials they were after. Had you known that? I hadn't. Like everyone else, I mainly remembered seeing the body of a dead American being dragged through the streets.

You can't blame the surviving Rangers for seeing the film of Bowden's book, now in theaters, as an opportunity for vindication. It's also a highly effective film, as vivid a fix as most of us are likely to get on what bravery and professionalism means in the modern U.S. military. Everyone should see it. (See it twice, actually—it takes repeat viewings to comprehend the rush of characters and events.)

But would Americans pay to see a film simply about bravery under fire, without a larger, heroic context? As Slate's Inigo Thomas pointed out weeks ago, soldiers can be brave in the service of disastrous policies. "Black Hawk Down's" makers appear to have had their doubts about the public appetite for mere heroism, because they have set about providing a larger, uplifting rationale. This has involved an aggressive deployment of PR firepower and a fog of appealing half-truths. Now that the film is succeeding at the box office, it's worth attempting to add back what the "Black Hawk" flacks have left out.

1. Was going after Aideed smart?

To justify the number of Africans killed in the film, Mr. Roth insisted that the film's central villain, Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid, be unmistakably portrayed as a "Hitler-like figure" responsible for thousands of killings.—Wall Street Journal

As reviews have noted, the film's audience gets only the minimum ration of information about the Somali "warlord" against whom the Ranger raid was directed. We're told he "ruled in Mogadishu" and "seized … food shipments at ports." The U.S., in 1992, sent Marines as part of a United Nations hunger relief effort. But "Aideed waits until the Marines withdraw, and then declares war on the remaining" U.N. forces, ambushing and killing a score of Pakistani peacekeepers. The Rangers are sent to "remove Aideed and restore order."

All true enough (though the film also has a brutal opening scene, labeled as having occurred on Oct. 2, of Aideed's forces shooting innocent civilians at a Red Cross food distribution center—an incident I can find nowhere in the literature). What the film doesn't tell you is:

• Aideed was the recognized leader of the Habr Gidr clan [Hawiye], "a large and powerful clan planted deep in Somalia's past and present political culture," in Bowden's words. The Habr Gidr [Hawiye] were the militarily more powerful of two main groups contending for control of Mogadishu. If the U.S. had killed Aideed, citizens of the Habr Gidr [Hawiye] areas wouldn't generally have felt liberated, like Afghans freed from the Taliban. They would more likely have been pissed off.
• The film conflates two distinct phases of U.S. and U.N. involvement in Somalia. In Phase I, the humanitarian phase, the U.N. used enough military force to allow food deliveries, which probably prevented hundreds of thousands of people from starving to death. But then the U.N. decided to go beyond providing food and, in Phase II, undertook some ambitious "nation-building"—"an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country," as America's then-U.N. ambassador Madeleine Albright modestly described it.
• Aideed, not without reason, felt U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was biased against him and his clan. In Boutros-Ghali's previous role as an Egyptian official he had been a supporter of Somali dictator Siad Barre, whom Aideed had overthrown.
  

"Nation-building" required working out a peace between the various clans, which clearly required some intimidation of Aideed's organization, the USC, since Aideed and the Habr Gidr [Hawiye] believed they'd earned the right to rule. When Aideed and the U.N. staged dueling peace conferences, and Aideed's militia detained some rivals at one of them, the U.N. "concluded he should be politically marginalized," in the words of Robert Oakley, who had successfully led the U.N.'s Phase I before returning home.

Was that a smart move? How do you "marginalize" the leadership of an entire clan? Oakley is diplomatic in his book, but he clearly thinks it was idiotic. If you're trying to bring peace to a country, you have to deal with the existing social structures and military powers. Realism please! In Afghanistan, where the U.S. has many times the intimidating military force it had in Somalia, there are plenty of vicious warlords and tribal leaders we've worked with rather than trying to "marginalize." Keep in mind that the decision to "marginalize" Aideed happened well before those Pakistani peacekeepers were killed.

2. What about retaliating for the attack on Pakistani peacekeepers?

"One of the Habr Gidr [Hawiye] clan's response to the U.N. efforts was to ambush 24 Pakstani soldiers under the world body's flag and literally to eviscerate them."— Press packet for "Black Hawk Down"

Again this is true, as far as it goes, and it's impossible to justify the brutal attack on the Pakistanis. Still, there are complications:

• The U.N. had decided to shut down Aideed's radio station, which broadcast anti-UN propaganda. Yet it was allowing the station of Aideed's main rival, Ali Mahdi, to remain open, allegedly on the theory that Ali Mahdi's station was unofficial. Aideed's faction saw this as biased—part of the ongoing U.N. tilt against it—and "had worked itself into seeing any interference with the radio station as a casus belli." (Oakley)
• The Pakistanis had in fact entered the radio station, looking for weapons. They were leaving, but crowds gathered thinking the station was under attack.
• A later independent investigative commission called the Pakistani inspection "highly provocative and unwise," according to Oakley's book.
  

The U.N. and its new top official, Adm. Jonathan Howe, immediately launched the now-famous manhunt for Aideed, which was also a campaign against Aideed's USC faction. Howe's position had a clear logic to it—the principle of "Don't Disembowel U.N. Peacekeepers" being a fairly important one to establish for future missions. But the U.N. lacked the means to carry out its pronouncements. 

Worse, there was the well-documented tendency of such vengeance missions to get out of control—one reason the Aideed manhunt was opposed by many in the Pentagon, including Marine Gen. Joseph Hoar, the commander responsible for Somalia. Hoar concluded there was only a one-in-four chance of catching Aideed—which the U.N., in fact, never did. (The Rangers formal mission, in the Oct. 3 raid shown in the movie, may have been simply to capture two of Aideed's aides. But they were clearly hoping to snare the man himself.)

What the U.N. could do is kill a lot of Habr Gidr [Hawiye] clansman.  On July 12, months before the Ranger raid, in an incident unremarked in all the "Black Hawk Down" hype, U.S. and U.N. forces attacked a Habr Gidr [Hawiye] clan meeting. The meeting included clan elders, intellectuals, poets. It was held at the house of Aideed's self-styled "defense" minister, but included Habr Gidr [Hawiye] members who planned to argue against Aideed's anti-U.N. stance. Indeed, the meeting had been called to consider a Howe "peace initiative," according to Bowden. Instead, as reported by the Washington Post's Keith Richburg:

[I]t was a slaughter. A half-dozen Cobras pumped sixteen TOW missiles and two thousand rounds of cannon fire into the house with deadly accuracy. First they blew away the stairwell to prevent anyone from escaping. … A video taken just after the attack showed the mangled bodies literally blown apart in the attack—the religious leaders, the elders, even the women in their colorful wrap dresses who were always on hand to serve the tea.

Somali crowds, enraged by the attack, immediately turned on four Western journalists who had gone to cover it, killing them.

The July 12 massacre caused the entire Habr Gidr [Hawiye] clan—and some other clans—to rally behind Aideed (which helps explain why, when the Black Hawk goes down, the whole city seems to surround and attack the crew). The massacre turned Richburg—who despised Aideed as "evil" and had egged on the U.N.—against the whole Somalia operation. Another bloody battle in September, in which women and children were killed, apparently disturbed President Clinton, who launched a muddled peace initiative designed to somehow include Aideed in negotiations. But the get-Aideed orders to the Rangers were never revoked—resulting in the October 3 raid.

3. Did Clinton cave in after the raid and sell out the Rangers?

"There's no doubt that the perception people have of this episode is that it was a total fiasco. But this was a successfully completed mission. … The failure was Clinton's decision to pull out the day after this happened. The truth is he lacked the kind of moral personal force that it took to persuade Congress and the American people that even though this is not popular, we have to do it."—Bowden, in an interview with Elizabeth Snead, reporting for the Washington Post

A few days after the Rangers' deaths and the humiliating CNN coverage, Clinton did completely reverse course. He announced it had been a mistake to "personalize the conflict." He sent in more firepower, but only to cover a U.S. withdrawal. Nation-building was over. The key anti-Aideed Clinton official was removed from his post, and Oakley was sent back in to negotiate. Within weeks, Oakley was flying Aideed to a peace conference on a U.S. plane.

Was this reversal obviously wrong? To make the counterargument against Mark Bowden's recent anti-Clinton declarations, I'd like to introduce … Mark Bowden, who in his book writes:

We will never know if Admiral Jonathan Howe was right to believe a lasting peace might have been achieved in Somalia if Aidid had been captured or his clan dismantled as a military force. It seems unlikely. … The Habr Gidr [Hawiye] is a large and powerful clan  … To think that 450 superb American soldiers could uproot it violently, thereby clearing the way for, as General Powell puts it, "an outbreak of Jeffersonian democracy," seems far-fetched. In the end, the Battle of the Black Sea is another lesson in the limits of what force can accomplish. [Emphasis added]

The Rangers who criticize Clinton say he shouldn't have been spooked by a mere 18 American casualties. ("We kicked their butt, but that was at a tactical level," one Army commander told the Wall Street Journal. "At the strategic and political level, when you have some casualties, it looks like there was a problem.") That seems right—though it's the opposite of the standard conservative criticism of humanitarian "nation-building," which holds that such interventions are only justified if they meet what Charles Krauthammer calls the "paramount criterion: costlessness."

The problem is that there were more than 18 Americans dead. There were also hundreds and hundreds of Somali dead. The raid's defenders see that as one of its achievements—in military terms, the casualty "exchange ratio" was very favorable to the U.S.. We kicked their butt! "If they did the exact same mission today and captured two of bin Laden's top guys with the same numbers, that would be considered a triumph," Bowden says, accurately. But we're trying kill to al-Qaida members. We weren't in Somalia to kill Habr Gidr [Hawiye] members. We were there to help, remember? The mission was to capture Aideed without killing hundreds of people, and as the film of "Black Hawk Down" makes graphically clear, this was not accomplished. With such a favorable "exchange ratio," Phase II of the Somali mission was rapidly approaching destroy-the-village-in-order-to-save-it territory.

That's not to say the overall Somali intervention was a failure: Phase I's success in warding off mass starvation vastly outweighs the failure of nation-building in Phase II. What's more, we now know there are potential costs to the world of "failed states" like Somalia, since failed states are where terrorists like to hide. Clinton's retreat, however justified, also seems to have been interpreted by the al Qaida terrorists as a sign of U.S. weakness. Maybe these considerations are what prompted Bowden to reverse his judgment of the Rangers' Somali operation. Also, he had a movie to promote.

But that gets to the final distortion of "Black Hawk Down's" PR campaign. It's not just in Americans' memories that the Battle of Mogadishu is remembered as a tragic fiasco. The movie depicts it as a tragic fiasco. The film makes only the weakest attempt to portray the battle as any sort of victory. It ends with shots of caskets and the sense that nothing much at all has been accomplished after hours of brutal chaos and destruction. (There is no celebration, for example, at the capture of the two Aideed aides.) If the goal of the film's makers, as opposed to its spinners, was to tell the world about America's "brightest hour," then they failed in their mission too.

P.S.: American soldiers may soon be back in Somalia, if they're not there already, in pursuit of al-Qaida. Couldn't this have legitimately been used to promote the film? Sure. The only trouble is that our most likely ally in the anti-terror fight will be Hussein Aideed, leader of the Habr Gidr [Hawiye]clan and son of the "Hitler-like" villain in "Black Hawk Down." No wonder the film's promoters chose not to play up the post-9/11 "return to Somalia" angle. . . .

Source: kausfiles special--Political Commentary & More